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CONTINGENT DESIGN & THE COURT REFORM DEBATE 
G. Michael Parsons* 
Once unimaginable, the prospect of Supreme Court reform seems increasingly real. Republican 
presidents have appointed fifteen of the last twenty Justices despite losing the popular vote in 
seven of the last eight elections, and these figures can no longer be chalked up to the timing of 
vacancies alone. After blocking President Obama’s nominee for Justice Scalia’s seat for almost a 
year to purportedly give “the American people a voice in selecting their next Supreme Court 
Justice,” Senate Republicans filled Justice Ginsburg’s seat with President Trump’s nominee mere 
weeks before the 2020 election. With Democrats now in control, the debate has turned to what 
new policies might replace the old, defunct norms. 
According to conventional wisdom, this debate revolves around one task: identifying the reform 
plan that best threads a needle between political reality and legal rigor. This is because Congress 
will presumably get “one shot” before the benefits of time and inertia shift to the Court itself. The 
consequences of this framing are profound: reformers water down popular policies to protect 
against invalidation, court-packing dominates the debate based on its constitutional credentials, 
and the chance to achieve real change quickly starts to slip away. 
This Article challenges the premise Congress must take such a passive approach to judicial review, 
expressing policy preferences in seriatim fashion (and being “sent back to the drawing board” 
each time a policy fails). This approach merely reflects institutional habits. And by failing to 
question these habits, reformers forfeit an enormous amount of legislative power. 
Congress can reclaim this power by strategically structuring judicial review using two methods. 
First, Congress can constitutionally safeguard its reform agenda by layering its policy preferences 
from most politically desirable to most legally defensible using “fallback” (or “backup”) law. If the 
Court holds the first preference unconstitutional, the second will automatically take its place—and 
so on. Thus, the Court shoulders the inertial cost of its own unpredictability. While it retains the 
power to evaluate each layer’s lawfulness, it cannot wage a war of attrition against Congress. 
Second, Congress can politically safeguard its power by designing appellate procedures that 
consolidate and prioritize all challenges to the law. By giving the same coalition that enacted the 
law a chance to respond to the Court’s decision, this approach insures against the tail risk of total 
invalidation and prevents the Court from “running out the clock” against Congress. 
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By identifying how existing court-reform proposals price in the inertia- and time-related risks of 
a passive approach and by proactively neutralizing those risks, this more strategic frame opens up 
new reform possibilities. It also offers two warnings. First, because the time available to Congress 
is a source of institutional power, Congress should begin its work straightaway and enact a reform 
package as early as possible in the current session. Second, Congress should avoid pursuing a 
single “best” policy given that this could perversely shrink the space for agreement. Instead, 
Congress should layer its reform proposals in whatever way produces the strongest coalition and 
the most durable plan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once a third rail in American politics, the prospect of Supreme Court 
reform is now mainstream—and it’s easy to see why. The traditions and 
conventions we typically associate with judicial independence are historically 
contingent,
1
 and the past few years have seen a surge in norm-breaking by 
Republicans
2
 to an extent that has made Democratic complacency 
unacceptable, including to longtime skeptics of court reform.
3
 
Calls for court packing, for example, have quickly gone from unthinkably 
radical to part of an “everything is on the table” posture embraced by 
 
1 Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 517 
(2018) [hereinafter Grove, Judicial Independence] (arguing that “the current conventions of judicial 
independence depend in part on narratives crafted by our political and legal culture”). 
2 Examples include routine filibustering to block judicial nominees (in the minority); ending “blue 
slips,” where Senators can informally veto home-state nominees; foregoing ABA review of nominees; 
refusing to hold hearings on President Obama’s nominee to fill Justice Scalia’s seat, and confirming 
President Trump nominees after his loss. See E.J. Dionne Jr. et al., How the GOP Prompted the 
Decay of Political Norms, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/gop-decay-of-political norms/540165/ (The 
Republican party has seen a “deterioration in the standards of political behavior” take root); Dahlia 
Lithwick & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Mitch McConnell Is Cranking Out Lame-Duck Judges, SLATE 
(Dec. 17, 2020, 6:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/mitch-mcconnell-lame-duck-
judges.html (Republican Senator Mitch McConnell “push[ed] through yet more judges even after his 
party has lost the presidency in a national election”). Such moves are sometimes referred to in the 
literature as “constitutional hardball.” See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (“[I]t consists of political claims and practices—legislative and executive 
initiatives—that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and 
practice but that are nonetheless in tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings.”).  
 
  To be sure, Democratic responses contributed to this decay in norms (such as Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid’s disposal of the filibuster for all lower court appointments), and accusations of 
“unprecedented” behavior admittedly represent “creative act[s] of interpretation” that reflect political 
judgments. See generally Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the 
Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96 (2017). Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus 
that Republicans have more readily embraced these hardball tactics over the last few decades. Joseph 
Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 920–26 
(2018). 
3 Various 2020 Democratic presidential candidates showed interest in altering the Court despite the 
topic having “until recently remain[ed] on the fringes of the debate.” Burgess Everett & Marianne 
Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 (including 
Senators Elizabeth Warren and Kirsten Gillibrand). See also Quinta Jurecic & Susan Hennessey, 
The Reckless Race to Confirm Amy Coney Barrett Justifies Court Packing, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/skeptic-case-court-packing/616607/ (the 
most common suggestion has been to add two seats to the Court). 
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 Even Joe Biden—a practiced centrist initially reluctant 
to wade into the debate on the campaign trail
5
—eventually pledged to create a 
commission to study what reforms might be available to fix a system that had 
grown “out of whack.”
6
 
With Biden’s election and Democratic control of Congress,
7
 the debate 
has now shifted from a question of “whether” to questions about “what” and 
“when.” Will President Biden’s commission help create consensus or just 
waste precious time?
8
 Can Democrats construct a political coalition in 2021 or 




 4 See Jeff Shesol, The Case Against Packing the Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/159691/case-against-packing-supreme-court (quoting Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer that “[n]othing is off the table” if Republicans appoint Barrett to 
fill Ginsburg’s seat before the 2020 election); see also Andrew K. Jennings & Athul K. Acharya, The 
Supreme Court and the 177th Congress, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 407, 408–09 (2020) 
(“[P]rominent members of Congress, including Representative Jerry Nadler (the chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over federal courts), have suggested that expanding the 
Court would be an appropriate response to a pre-election or lame-duck confirmation.”); Ryan D. 
Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 2, 3 n.1 
(forthcoming 2021) (quoting Ian Millhiser, Vox’s Supreme Court reporter, for the point that court-
packing would have seemed “extraordinarily radical” only “two years ago”). 
 5 See generally EVAN OSNOS, JOE BIDEN: THE LIFE, THE RUN, AND WHAT MATTERS NOW (2020) 
(examining Joe Biden’s quest for the presidency and how history placed him at “pivotal moments of 
modern history”). 
 6 Sam Gringlas, Asked About Court Packing, Biden Says He Will Convene Commission to Study 
Reforms, NPR (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/22/926607920/asked-about-
court-packing-biden-says-he-will-convene-commission-to-study-reforms. 
 7 Given that Vice President Kamala Harris is not a member of the Senate, the Senate is technically a 
“tied Senate” despite Democrats having effective majority control given Harris’s tie-breaking role. 
See Louis Jacobson, How Will the Senate Work Under a 50-50 Split?, POLITIFACT (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/07/how-will-senate-work-under-50-50-tie/ (“[T]here is no 
written roadmap that Senate leaders must follow.”).  
 8 See Niels Lesniewski, Biden’s Court Commission Draws Ire of Court-packing Critics and 
Supporters, ROLL CALL (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:24 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/10/22/bidens-
court-commission-draws-ire-of-court-packing-critics-and-supporters/ (describing President Biden’s 
desire to create a commission).  
 9 Democratic Senator Joe Manchin, who “[i]n a deadlocked Senate . . . could be the deciding vote on 
a wide range of issues,” opposes packing the Court. Salena Zito, Joe Manchin Digs In: ‘Under No 
Circumstances’ Would Break Tie to Nuke Filibuster and Pack Court, WASHINGTON EXAMINER 
(Nov. 11, 2020, 6:58 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/joe-manchin-digs-in-
under-no-circumstances-would-break-tie-to-nuke-filibuster-and-pack-court. See also Matt Ford, The 
Supreme Court Is in Charge Now, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/160178/supreme-court-biden-judicial-gridlock (“Even if [Democrats 
win the Georgia runoffs], court reform is effectively dead for the foreseeable future. Democrats would 
have had an uphill battle to pack the Supreme Court even with a substantial majority in the House 
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Should reformers seek changes to the Court’s personnel or to its underlying 
power?
10
 And which option (among the several available in each category) 




While these questions are vital, I argue in this Article that they are being 
artificially constrained and distorted by an unnecessary set of assumptions—an 
implicit framing of the debate in which Congress imagines itself to be a passive 
actor. This framing assumes (1) that Congress can only express singular 
preferences about court design in seriatim fashion (with Congress “sent back 
to the drawing board” to enact new legislation if the Court finds the first policy 
unconstitutional), and (2) that the Court will review legislation under the 
procedures (and at the pace) of typical litigation. These two assumptions 
silently cede an enormous amount of institutional power—the power of inertia 
and time—from Congress to the Court. And taken together or separately, they 
reflect a surprising self-abnegation, forfeiting key sources of legislative leverage. 
In this Article, I challenge this passive account and explain how Congress 
can proactively set the terms of the debate to meet the Court on more level 
ground. Congress could do so in two ways: (1) using contingent provisions 
(otherwise known as “fallback” or “backup” law) to layer its design preferences 
from most politically desirable to most constitutionally defensible, and (2) 
designing specific appellate procedures to consolidate and prioritize 
challenges so that the same political coalition that enacted the court-reform 
package has a chance to respond to the Court’s decisions about that law. 
By identifying how commentators have strategically (and unnecessarily) 
discounted policy options based on their relative inertia- and time-related 
risks, this proactive framing of the debate opens up a range of new political 
and legal options by greatly expanding the bargaining zone available to 
potential political coalition members. 
 
and a few extra seats in the Senate; the current margins will make it impossible even if they secure 
control of the Senate.”). 
 10 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 1–2 (“Progressives are taking Supreme Court reform seriously 
for the first time in almost a century.”); Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 407-10 (discussing the 
117th Congress’s legislative options to “expand the court, limit its certiorari discretion, restrict its 
jurisdiction, or reroute its jurisdiction” and concluding that any of these responses is possible). 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 42–52 (listing current set of statutory reform proposals). Like 
Professors Doerfler and Moyn, this Article focuses on statutory reforms options given the likely 
infeasibility of constitutional reform. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 4, n.3. 
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But first, how did we get here? The last meaningful discussion of Supreme 
Court reform occurred in the 1930s and long stood as “a cautionary tale more 
than an inspiring precedent.”
12
 Conservative and progressive scholars alike 
floated ideas to rein in judicial power over the years, but outside the academy 
the general shape and structure of the Court has remained unchallenged since 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s failed court-packing attempt.
13
 
Yet as Professor Tara Leigh Grove observes in her recent article charting 
our conventions about judicial independence, “[w]hat we currently view as 
utterly ‘out of bounds’” is highly contingent on historical developments and 
prevailing social and political forces.
14
 There is nothing inevitable about the 
particular “shared norms” that developed since the 1930s, and nothing to keep 
them norm-like when they cease being shared. 
Our current period of rapid norm-transformation is perhaps best 
explained (and bookended) by two statements by then-Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell.
15
 Following the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia, 
the first statement came on February 13, 2016 when McConnell vowed to 
block any nominee put forward by President Barack Obama to fill Scalia’s 
 
 12 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 4. See also Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a 
“Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 132 (2010) (describing the conventional wisdom 
that “FDR lost the battle, but won the war, since the Court . . . acceded to the New Deal’s 
constitutionality,” but observing that “FDR’s legislative assault on the Court destroyed his political 
coalition, in Congress and nationally . . . . The progressive domestic policy agenda did not recover 
until 1964”). 
 13 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 9–11. 
 14 Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 545. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On 
the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-
mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ (“Three years ago, the idea that the [Affordable Care 
Act’s] mandate to purchase health insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of most legal 
professionals and academics, simply crazy. . . . Yet in three years’ time, the argument . . . has moved 
from crazy to plausible . . . .”). 
15 There are, to be sure, deeper and longer trends at play as well. Professors Doerfler and Moyn posit 
the 2008 financial crisis led to the rise of a “political and academic left” with a more ambitious agenda 
and a more discerning appreciation for the structural bulwarks blocking progressive change beyond 
the edge of center-left liberalism. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 10. This trend followed an 
even longer forty-year campaign within conservative circles to make deeper inroads in legal academia 
and the courts. Maria Liasson & Barbara Sprunt, As Supreme Court Nears Solid Conservative 
Majority, GOP Reaps Reward From “Long Game”, NPR (Aug. 4, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/04/632865899/as-supreme-court-nears-solid-conservative-majority-
gop-reaps-reward-from-long-ga. Even so, the willingness of establishment liberals to contemplate 
reform seems triggered by more recent events. 
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 While the partisan politics of this obstruction were obvious, the position 
at least came accompanied by a neutral patina to provide public cover: “The 
American people should have a voice in the selection of their next Supreme 




Over the next four years, however, McConnell’s judicial campaign was 
never far from the headlines as it became increasingly aggressive. Following 
through on his vow, McConnell blocked President Obama’s moderate 
nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, for 293 days,
18
 and confirmed conservative 




Then the Court’s median “swing” vote, Justice Anthony Kennedy, decided 
to retire after hand-picking and personally suggesting his own successor: 
former Kennedy clerk and conservative judge, Brett Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh 
ascended to the seat following a confirmation battle in which he was credibly 
accused of sexual assault and offered shockingly partisan and vindictive 
testimony, calling the allegations against him “a calculated and orchestrated 
political hit” and “revenge on behalf of the Clintons.”
20
 
Finally, following the death of liberal stalwart Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Senate Republicans scrambled to fill her seat in less than a month with yet-
another reliable conservative: Justice Amy Coney Barrett. This sudden rush 
in the waning days of the 2020 presidential campaign
21
 put final lie to the 
Republican claim that they had blocked Garland’s nomination almost five 
 
16 Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement 
Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitch-
mcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248. 
17 Id. 
 18 Jess Bravin, President Obama’s Supreme Court Nomination of Merrick Garland Expires, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obamas-supreme-court-
nomination-of-merrick-garland-expires-1483463952. 
 19 Nina Totenberg, Senate Confirms Gorsuch to Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:47 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/07/522902281/senate-confirms-gorsuch-to-supreme-court. 
 20 Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L. J. 148, 158-59 
(2019). 
 21 Sahil Kapur et al., Senate Confirms Amy Coney Barrett, Heralding New Conservative Era for 
Supreme Court, NBC (Oct. 27, 2020, 6:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/amy-
coney-barrett-set-be-confirmed-supreme-court-monday-n1244748. 
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years prior based on “[a] long-standing tradition of not fulfilling a nomination 
in the middle of a presidential year.”
22
 
While Republicans’ disparate treatment of Garland and Barrett 
demonstrated that the norms governing appointments were no longer shared, 
McConnell’s closing statement following the confirmation of Justice Barrett 
removed all doubt: “A lot of what we’ve done over the last four years will be 
undone sooner or later by the next election . . . [but Democrats] won’t be able 
to do much about this for a long time to come.”
23
 
To be sure, nominations are (and long have been) a political affair, with 
partisan coalitions trying to lock in judges and Justices favorable to their 
agendas.
24





 and judicial detachment from popular sentiment
27
 has reached a 
new extreme. Today, five out of the six conservatives on the Court were 
appointed by Republican Presidents who lost the popular vote,
28
 and the most 
recent three of those Justices were confirmed by Senators representing a 
 
 22 Russell Wheeler, McConnell’s Fabricated History to Justify a 2020 Supreme Court Vote, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/09/24/mcconnells-
fabricated-history-to-justify-a-2020-supreme-court-vote/ (quoting McConnell). 
 23 ‘They Won’t Be Able to Do Anything About This’: McConnell Revels in Barrett Supreme Court 
Vote, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2020, 3:43 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/oct/25/mitch-mcconnell-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-
republicans-democrats-mike-pence-covid. 
24 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 77-80 (2020) (discussing 
“partisan entrenchment” in the federal judiciary). 
25 NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS 
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2019) (observing that the Justices reflect the “polarization that 
has had its greatest effects in elite segments of American society”); Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, 
at 155–56 (“[T]he Supreme Court is perfectly polarized on party lines as well—for the first time, all 
Democrat-appointed Justices are reliably liberal and all Republican-appointed Justices are reliably 
conservative.”). 
26 See BALKIN, supra note 24 at 69, 81–84 (observing that the partisan definitions of what counts as 
“judicial activism” or “judicial restraint” change with the cycle of political regimes, but that the Court’s 
power as a whole tends to grow through these cycles regardless). 
27 See infra notes 28-29. 
28 See Ronald Brownstein, Fight over Ginsburg Succession Poses Stark Question: Can Majority Rule 
Survive in US?, CNN (Sept. 20, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/20/politics/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-supreme-court-successor/index.html (noting that in addition to the three justices nominated 
by President Trump, who lost the popular vote, two of the six “currently serving Republican-
appointed justices were nominated by President George W. Bush, who also initially lost the popular 
vote. The final one, Clarence Thomas, was approved by senators who also represented less than half 
of Americans.”). 
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minority of the American people as well.
29
 This new “minoritarian majority” 
of Justices exercises more power than ever before, and they exercise it in more 
reliably partisan ways than ever before.
30
 
In short, “[f]or the first time in living memory, the [C]ourt will be seen by 
the public as a party-dominated institution, one whose votes on controversial 
issues are essentially determined by the party affiliation of [their appointing] 
presidents.”
31
 And while the concept of judicial independence contemplates 
judges who can decide discrete cases free from the vicissitudes of public 
opinion once in office,
32
 it is incompatible with an appointment process that 
creates a durable partisan power center. Indeed, the most historically 
significant attempts to capture the courts in this way predate our modern 
conventions and resulted—predictably—in backlashes to restore whatever 
relative balance had been disrupted.
33
 
And so our current moment unfolds in predictable fashion. Overreach is 
met with correction. The violation of past norms unsettles expectations until 
new conventions create a new equilibrium. The current debates over court-




These are important questions, no doubt. But so too is how we get there. 
This “new system” will not spontaneously arise: any changes must earn the 
support of a broad coalition, traverse both chambers of Congress, and then 
face the courts themselves. The power, policy, and politics of the result 
 
29 Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html (written about 
the last two appointments before Barrett). 
30 See generally DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 25. 
 31 Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html. 
 32 See infra notes 112, 149–153 (noting that the core of judicial independence is “decisional 
independence” and discussing the institutional safeguards created to allow such independence). 
 33 See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 507-08 (highlighting partisan efforts to modify 
the composition of the Court in advance of the Jefferson and Johnson administrations); Joshua 
Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2747, 2751 (2020) (distinguishing 
the legitimacy assigned to modifications to the Court’s size arising from circuit-riding from those that 
were primarily catalyzed by partisan motivations). 
 34 See, e.g., Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152 (noting that any proposal “needs to be stable going 
forward” in order to create “a fair equilibrium” and also evaluating proposals based on fairness). But 
cf. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 12-13 (critiquing definitions of “fair-dealing” that rely on 
assumptions of judicial non-partisanship or neutrality and aim to re-legitimate judicial power). 
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depend on the power, policy, and politics of the transition. The terms of that 
transition are our focus here. 
Part I identifies how the court reform debates to date have implicitly 
adopted a view of Congress that renders it a passive observer in the transition 
process. By unconsciously operating within this frame, legislators unilaterally 
relinquish otherwise-powerful sources of political consensus and institutional 
leverage. The passive framing also shapes and prelimits the options available 
to court reformers and warps comparisons between those options in ways that 
are avoidable once the assumptions underpinning the passive framing are let 
go. 
Part II explains how Congress can assert itself more strategically and 
proactively in the interbranch dialogue over court reform by enacting legal and 
political safeguards to govern the terms of the transition process and the 
accompanying interbranch dialogue. These include layering multiple 
contingent reforms via a set of “fallback” or “backup” provisions (to ensure 
overall constitutionality and to offset the risks associated with institutional 
inertia) as well as designing appellate procedures and prioritization 
requirements (to prevent the Judiciary from “waiting out” the political coalition 
that enacted the initial measure). 
While none of the methods set out in Part II are entirely novel, they have 
not been a part of the court reform debate and can play a particularly powerful 
and unique role in this context. Indeed, that these approaches are 
uncontroversial is an important source of their legal and political power. The 
active account reveals that the high stakes and high risks currently associated 
with various standalone reform proposals are largely a byproduct of 
institutional advantages that are imputed to the Court rather than inherent. 
Part III then offers an example of how a contingent approach to court 
reform might look, explores some benefits of the particular layers proposed, 
and anticipates potential objections to its layered design. 
I. PASSIVE FRAMING: THE SELF-IMPOSED LIMITS OF THE TRADITIONAL 
COURT REFORM DEBATES 
Over the past year, commentators, elected officials, and political 
candidates have contributed to a surge in debate over various court reform 
proposals and their merits. To some extent, this discussion incorporates the 
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challenges of transition, with commentators designing and weighing options 
based on the political and legal risks posed by each option.
35
 
Yet, at a deeper level, all of these discussions reflect a set of shared 
assumptions about how Congress must structure legislation and how the Court 
will review it. I call this set of assumptions the “passive frame,” and its 
fundamental premise is simple: the task facing Congress is to identify a singular 
reform plan that represents the best possible combination of political reality, 
constitutional defensibility, and institutional sufficiency. 
Why is the debate framed in this way? Because commentators presume 
Congress will only have “one shot” to get its proposal right at the time of 
enactment.
36
 Once Congress enacts its plan, the institutional benefits of time 
and inertia will shift to the Court—the institution that will ultimately decide the 
plan’s fate.
37
 The consequences of this framing on the debate are profound. 
If Congress overshoots its mark and enacts a plan that the Court finds 
unconstitutional, Congress will have spent a vast amount of political capital for 
nothing. Not only might Congress lack the ability to gear back up and enact a 
new plan (given shifting electoral pressures and competing political priorities), 
but the slow pace of litigation also means that the political coalition that 
enacted the plan may no longer exist due to intervening elections. “Congress,” 
after all, changes every two years. The Court does not. 
If Congress undershoots the mark, however, the cost of adequately 
anticipating the Court’s predilections may simply be inefficacy: a weak plan 
that fails to adequately set a new norm (or, perhaps, a plan so tepid that no 
coalition finds it worth enacting in the first place). 
 
 35 See, e.g., Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 172–204 (discussing and offering various proposals for 
Court reform); see also Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 25-71 (analyzing the multitude of 
justifications for Court reform from both “personnel” and “disempowering” perspectives). But see 
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 171 (suggesting a potential backup option in the form of a 
“threat” that might cause the Court to “blink before striking down a reform measure as 
unconstitutional,” such as adding “five new Justices” or removing the Court’s jurisdiction). For the 
reasons set out in Part III.C.3., such an approach might be more vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge in its own right. 
36      See supra Parts I.A. & I.B. 
 37 I say this as a practical and predictive manner, not as a prescriptive manner. I also bracket questions 
of justiciability in this piece, including standing and the political question doctrine. Court reformers 
of all stripes assume that a Court determined to find a “hook” for review will be able to do so. That 
makes evaluating the merits of plans a necessary endeavor, even if solely for strategic and political 
insurance. 
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This conundrum reveals how heavily the institutional advantages of inertia 
and time influence Congress’s calculus. Commentators believe the Court has 
inherent leverage in any fight over its future form. First, the Court can wage a 
war of attrition, rejecting proposals seriatim until Congress simply relents. 
Second, the Court can “run out the clock,” managing its docket to slow down 
review of the legislation and “wait out” the political coalition that enacted the 
initial reform. 
Yet these supposed institutional advantages are not inevitable. Instead, 
they result from various players (judicial, legislative, academic) settling into 
patterns associated with, but not demanded by, judicial supremacy. Identifying 
these trappings of judicial supremacy helps us to prevent imputing more power 
to the Court than it deserves or has traditionally claimed. For even if one 
believes (rightly or wrongly)
38
 that the Supreme Court does or should have 
interpretive supremacy over the substantive meaning of the Constitution, one 
need not subscribe to any broader view of institutional supremacy or power. 
Congress still retains a robust set of powers to structure the terms of its 
interbranch dialogue with the Court—powers that have been left on the table 
to date. By overlooking the effect of these powers on the larger court reform 
debate, scholars and elected officials are unintentionally prelimiting their 
universe of potential design options and unnecessarily constricting their ability 
to form the broadest possible political coalition. 
In the rest of Part I below, I provide some examples of how the passive 
view of Congress not only shapes the design of individual court reforms but 
also impacts the comparison between those design options, including which 
designs seem worth pursuing at all. 
A. The Impact on Option Design 
As Professors Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn observe in a recent article, 
court reform proposals generally fall into one of two categories: changes to the 
Court’s personnel or changes to the Court’s power.39 
 
 38 For discussions of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism, see generally MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004). 
 39 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17-18. See also Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 410 
(identifying two court reform options that affect personnel and two that affect jurisdiction). 
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Personnel reforms “propose to alter the Supreme Court’s partisan or 
ideological composition”
40
 to help protect the Court’s legitimacy (“that is, the 
degree to which it is perceived as legitimate by the American people”).
41
 





senior-status requirements after a term of years (e.g., 18 years),
44
 or more 





proposed by Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman. For the most 
part, personnel reforms take for granted the powerful role that the Court plays 
in American society today—they just aim to make the exercise of that power 
“fairer” (whether by moderating the Court’s politics or by regularizing 
appointments so that the Court’s politics are never durably minoritarian).
47
 
Disempowering reforms, on the other hand, are about “institutional 
redefinition” rather than “institutional relegitimation.”
48
 Rather than focus on 
who sits on the Court, they focus on what the Court can do.
49
 Examples of 
disempowering proposals include jurisdiction-stripping,
50
 supermajority voting 
 
40 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17. 
41 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 150–51. 
42 See e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 19 (describing the “pack the courts” movement); Epps & 
Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 175–77 (discussing what court-packing is and entails). 
43 See e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 19–20; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 175 
(describing potential Supreme Court panel systems). 
44 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 173–75. Many “term limit”-style plans originated as proposals 
for constitutional amendments. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or 
Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1211–12 (1988) (recommending lawmakers consider both an age 
limit and a term limit of fifteen to twenty years for Supreme Court Justices); Philip D. Oliver, 
Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for 
Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986) (outlining the benefits 
of a Supreme Court whose members are limited to eighteen-year terms); James E. DiTullio & John 
B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the 
Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen‐Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004) 
(proposing the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would limit Supreme Court service to a 
fixed eighteen-year term). 
45 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 193–205. 
46 Id. at 181–92. 
47 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17–25 (distinguishing between “moderating” reforms and 
“democratizing” reforms). 
 48 Id. at 8. 
 49 Id. at 18. 
 50 Id. at 23–24; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 177–79. 
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rules for judicial review,
51
 and congressional review procedures.
52
 These 
approaches “limit the Supreme Court’s ability to make policy to varying 




For this Article, however, the specific details of each plan and the different 
values each promotes are less important than one feature they all share: they 
are each envisioned and evaluated as “standalone” options. Each proposal is 
designed on the assumption that there is unlikely to be much political appetite 
for going “multiple rounds” with the Court and so any political and legal risks 
must be addressed from the outset. 
Consider one of the most popular personnel reforms: requiring Justices to 
take “senior status” after eighteen years so that a new Justice can be appointed 
every two years.
54
 This approach would regularize the appointment process, 
give every president two appointments, and ensure that the “active” members 
of the Court never reflect any durable partisan affiliation. Although this 
proposal is often colloquially said to create “term limits” for the Justices, the 
moniker is not quite right: Justices would retain a lifetime appointment, 
continue to decide cases by sitting on the circuit courts, and could “fill in” any 
 
 51 See generally Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court 
Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L. J. 73 (2003) (describing how Congress could 
instate supermajority rules to fix the pattern of the Supreme Court invalidating federal legislation by 
a bare majority); Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 24 (claiming that a supermajority rule “would 
effectively implement a Thayerian ‘clear error’ standard for judicial review” (citing James B. Thayer, 
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 
(1893))); Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 190–92 (describing arguments for and against 
supermajority voting rules); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus 
and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003) (detailing how using a 
supermajority rule could resolve decreased consensus and deference to Congress on the Supreme 
Court); Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 
1692 (2014) (discussing majority decision and arguments against it). But see Caminker, supra, at 94–
101 (identifying some difficulties with justifying supermajority rules on the logic of operationalizing 
Thayerian deference, but arguing that this “misses the fundamental point” that supermajority rules 
“can serve as an independent mechanism for tempering the aggressiveness of judicial review . . . .”); 
Guha Krishnamurthi, For Judicial Majoritarianism, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201 (2020) (providing a 
defense of majority voting on appellate courts over supermajority or unanimity rules). 
 52 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
 53 Id. at 18. 
 54 See id. at 21–22. 
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vacant Supreme Court seats that might open prematurely due to an active 
Justice’s retirement or death.
55
 
This proposal has enjoyed strong bipartisan support over the years, has no 
obvious or durable political valence over time, and—in our current moment—
seems uniquely suited to creating a new, stable norm.
56
 But is it constitutional? 




 its constitutionality, the 
odds of such a plan being upheld are highly uncertain. And while scholars may 
be comfortable opining about the plausibility of the plan’s constitutionality,59 
legislators are unlikely to find similar comfort in such lukewarm assurances. 
This fear of invalidation has prompted proponents to preempt concerns 
by including a “grandfather” clause. This clause suspends the operation of the 
senior-status requirement for sitting Justices and limits its application to future 
appointments.
60
 From a legal perspective, the clause is thought to strengthen 
the constitutionality of the Act “by eliminating a retroactive application of the 
Act’s redefinition of the ‘office’ of a Supreme Court Justice.”
61
 And from a 
 
55  See generally Term Limits, FIX THE COURT, https://fixthecourt.com/fix/term-limits/ (last updated 
Sept. 29, 2020) (providing an overview of the key distinctions between retirement and senior status). 
56 See infra Part III.B.1.i. for a discussion of the benefits of implementing an eighteen-year senior-status 
requirement as the “Layer One” reform. 
57 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to 
Basic Principles, PAULCARRINGTON.COM (July 5, 2005), 
http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm (proposing that Congress 
enact a law imposing term limits and related measures in order to prevent the negative consequences 
of lifetime tenure); see also, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1313, 1323–34 (2007) (advocating for implementation of Supreme Court term limits by statute or 
constitutional amendment). 
58 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 855–68 (2006) (discussing arguments in opposition 
to reforms related to lifetime tenure). 
59 See, e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 51; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152 
(highlighting the precise proposals conducted by scholars, Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman). If 
the Court observed a Thayerian account of judicial review, “plausibility” might roughly track 
constitutionality, see note 51, but that is not how the Court currently understands its role and not how 
reformers and scholars approach the question today.  
 60 See, e.g., Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act of 2020, H.R. 8424, 116th 
Cong. § 2 (2020) (stating that no Justice appointed before the date of enactment of this Act shall be 
required to retire pursuant to the Act’s subsection (a)); see Carrington & Cramton, supra note 
55(proposing a rotational system wherein all Justices appointed to the Court in the future would serve 
as the nine deliberating and deciding members for a period of eighteen years); see also Vicki C. 
Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 
GEO. L.J. 965, 1001 (2007) (mentioning two proposed schemes for eighteen-year term limits for 
Supreme Court Justices that apply only prospectively to new appointees). 
 61 Carrington & Cramton, supra note 55. 
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political perspective, it might increase the odds that the law is upheld because 
it “buys out” the Justices who will likely rule on the constitutionality of the 
measure itself. 
Here we can see how a passive framing of the issue warps the proposal. 
Even if one believes a grandfather clause is not legally necessary, advocates 
and legislators are compelled to include it to give the plan its “best shot” at 
survival. This calculation takes the Supreme Court’s supposed institutional 
advantages of inertia and time into account when building the proposal. 
But the very inclusion of the clause changes the stakes of the plan and the 
potential coalitions that might support it. A plan implemented in dribs and 
drabs over the next forty years presents a very different proposition than a plan 
that would see the four most senior Justices (Thomas, Breyer, Roberts, and 
Alito) take senior status over the next eight years.
62
 
The influence of the passive frame also silently guides the shape of popular 
disempowering reforms like jurisdiction-stripping. The general concept 
behind jurisdiction-stripping is simple: Congress removes the jurisdiction of 
the courts to hear certain kind of cases, effectively leaving those disputes to 
political rather than judicial resolution.
63
 
But this purported simplicity is deceiving. “[T]he constitutionality of 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals remains one of the most significant 
unanswered questions in the field of federal courts,”
64
 and the questions 
“become more difficult the more comprehensive the strip.”
65
 Given these 
concerns, Congress has generally declined to enact the vast majority of 
 
 62 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 61 (calling one set of term limits proposals “feasible because 
trivial” and stating passage would make little difference). At the time of writing, Justice Breyer has not 
yet announced his retirement. 
 63 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that “[b]y removing the judiciary from the process, 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation would tie policy outcomes exclusively to the most recent 
congressional and presidential legislation”). 
 64 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 178 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping 
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2010), and Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of 
Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 
VA. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2012)) (emphasizing that “[T]here is one [question] in particular that 
puzzled scholars unlike any other: whether Congress can withhold all federal jurisdiction…in a case 
raising a federal constitutional claim); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953) 
(fearing “destr[uction of] the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”). 
 65 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 54. 
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jurisdiction-stripping statutes that have been introduced over the years,
66
 and 
the Court has studiously avoided directly ruling on the constitutionality of 
those statutes that have managed to survive the legislative process.
67
 This 
uneasy truce has persisted for generations, and an explicit jurisdiction-stripping 
bill would push Congress into clear confrontation with the Court. 
Of course, the whole point of jurisdiction-stripping legislation is to directly 
limit the Court’s reach and explicitly reserve questions for political resolution. 
But, here too, congressional fears about the potential judicial response 
preemptively shape the specific scope of the proposal. The risk is that the 
Court might get the final word, with Congress shying away from future forays 
if it receives a strong rebuke. 
Jurisdiction-stripping proposals thus reflect the same balance between 
minimizing risk and undermining the efficacy of the reform. A strip that is 
sweeping—whether in court coverage or substance matter coverage
68
—would be 
more efficacious but riskier. A more limited strip might assuage constitutional 
concerns
69
 but simply not be worth the effort. 
In short, the instinct to “preempt constitutional concerns” by watering-
down or qualifying the proposal at hand often has less to do with the 
proponent’s independent interpretive judgment about constitutional meaning 
and more to do with a belief that the Court holds a strategic institutional upper 
hand. 
B. The Impact on Option Comparison 
This strategizing over the likelihood of survival also informs the 
comparison between options. 
First, it focuses undue attention on the comparison between court-packing 
and, well, everything else. Because court-packing is a plainly constitutional 
 
 66 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 
880–887 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards] (describing the long history of jurisdiction-
stripping efforts). 
 67 Fallon, supra note 64, at 1045 (“[O]n the infrequent occasions when Congress has enacted laws that 
appear to attempt comprehensive jurisdiction withdrawals, the Supreme Court, more often than not, 
has strained to read them as effecting less than total preclusions . . . to avoid the serious constitutional 
questions that otherwise would arise.”). 
 68 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 22–23 (discussing calls for sweeping strips such as prohibiting 
courts from reviewing federal legislation or constitutionality at all). 
 69 To be fair, a targeted strip might raise different constitutional concerns that a more general strip does 
not. 
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option, it receives attention disproportionate to its other risks and benefits. 
Does abandoning the convention of nine Justices risk a popular backlash and 
a quick loss in the political capital necessary to pursue other legislation?
70
 Sure. 
Does court-packing risk retaliation and escalation?
71
 Sure. Does “reciprocal 
hardball can play into the hands of authoritarians by alienating moderates, 
unifying autocratic forces, and even providing a pretext for government 
repression?”
72
 Sure. But is it certain to survive the judicial gauntlet? You bet.
73
 
And for many reformers, that is (understandably) priority number one. 
Second, the danger of judicial invalidation pushes some of the most 
intriguing contenders out of the debate given the relative degree of uncertainty 
they prompt. Even someone who supports ideas like the “lottery,” broad 
jurisdiction-stripping, or congressional review in theory may be 
understandably skeptical to do so in fact, given the stakes. Simply put, a once-
in-a-century moment does not seem like a great time to test out a creative idea 
or explore the limits of one of the biggest debates in federal courts. 
Third, the assumptions implicit in the passive account distort the 
comparison between personnel versus disempowering approaches more 
generally. While these two categories might be squared off to determine which 
is worth pursuing,
74
 this either/or framing rests on an assumption that the 
enactment of one is likely to come at the expense of the other given the 
political capital it will take to enact any reform. But the issues presented by 
personnel and disempowering reforms are related.
75
 Personnel changes might 
be unlikely to have the kind of deep, structural impact of disempowering 
 
70 Pildes, supra note 12, at 132 (“Reflecting back, FDR’s second vice president, Henry Wallace, 
observed: ‘The whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight.’ No 
rational politician, looking back at FDR’s attempt to bring the Court into line, other than through the 
ordinary appointments process, is likely to repeat FDR’s efforts.”). 
71 Braver, supra note 33, at 2793 (explaining that “[b]ecause court packing is irreversible, the sole form 
of available retaliation is more packing, an escalatory pattern that is lethal for the Supreme Court”). 
72 Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—And the Court, 134 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 242 (2020) (citing STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES 
DIE 215–16 (2018)). 
73 But see Will Baude, Why Isn’t Court-Packing Unconstitutional?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 
31, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/31/why-isnt-court-packing-unconstitutional/ 
(arguing that the constitutionality of court-packing is at least debatable). 
 74 See generally Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 51 (highlighting both personnel and disempowering 
reform proposals). 
 75 Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that the absence of institutional intervention “affects 
both personnel and disempowering reforms alike”). 
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changes, but disempowering changes—standing alone—might be unable to 
survive judicial review without substantial personnel changes. 
*               *               * 
As this Part demonstrates, the legislative anticipation of judicial review 
alone profoundly shapes the content of court reform proposals and the 
comparison between those proposals. But what if Congress did not feel bullied 
into proposing a watered-down plan from the outset? What if the alternative 
to full and immediate implementation was not complete invalidation?  
 
II. ACTIVE FRAMING: SETTING THE TERMS OF INTERBRANCH 
DIALOGUE 
Given that the entire court reform debate focuses specifically on regulating 
a coordinate branch, surprisingly little scholarship interrogates the process 
through which this new institutional settlement will unfold. And with 
substantive policies and analysis so focused on reining in the Court’s 
institutional power, the failure to identify and challenge the supposed 
advantage of inertia and time ascribed to the Court constitutes a curious gap 
in the literature and the popular debate. 
In this Part, I propose two ways Congress could proactively offset 
interbranch inequalities in both the substantive and procedural design of any 
court reform package. These approaches will strengthen Congress’s 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the Court and can be applied to any number of 
substantive reform proposals. And while these approaches minimize the 
power differential between the Court and Congress in the specific interbranch 




A. Constitutional Safeguarding: Inertia v. Layered Design 
The first approach is to build any court reform legislation in a series of 
substantive policy layers, with each layer’s operational status contingent on a 
constitutional ruling by the Court. Rather than Congress bearing the inertial 
cost of the Court’s unpredictability, both parties would bear the cost equally. 
 
 76 Although judicial supremacy may be worth challenging through a variety of cultural, legal, and 
political avenues over time, that is a more complex and charged topic beyond the scope of this Article. 
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If the Court deems the first-preference policy unconstitutional, the second-
preference policy takes its place. If the Court deems the second-preference 
policy unconstitutional, the third-preference policy takes its place—and so on. 
In short, the Court would remain entitled to act on the legislation, but it 
could not wage a war of attrition against Congress by leveraging the power of 
inertia and forcing Congress to consider the question anew with each round. 
Constitutionally safeguarding legislation through layered design could 
open valuable spaces in the court reform debate that are currently closed off. 
First, it allows for a cleaner debate over the relative merits of various reform 
options. Once the risk of wholesale invalidation is replaced with a next-best 
alternative policy, the debate can proceed undistorted by strategic 
considerations about what the Court might decide. Consider how the merits 
of court-packing compare to other design options when the downside risk is 
no longer complete policy failure.
77
 
Second, layered design creates new coalitional opportunities by increasing 
the bargaining zone available to legislators. Legislators can reserve higher 
layers for their most politically preferred policies and lower layers for those 
designs most certain to survive judicial review. For example, a progressive 
legislator might not be willing to vote for a senior-status approach that includes 
a grandfather clause because such a plan would lock in conservative control in 
the near term and reward norm-breaking behavior by Republicans.
78
 If the 
grandfather clause were removed, however, the legislator might be on board. 
Inversely, a moderate legislator might find court-packing too radical as a 
standalone plan but might be willing to reconsider their stance on the Court’s 
size if they knew in advance that such a proposal would only be triggered if the 
Court had already invalidated multiple other layers of their preferred policies. 
In short, taking a layered approach to court reform could bring more 
robust options to the table, expand the scope of debate, and enhance the odds 
Congress enacts reforms that it prefers rather than designing legislation from 




 77      See supra Part I.B. for the comparison of court-packing against other policy designs.  
78  See Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term Limits, 
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3788497 
(manuscript at 3) (explaining that the average time to transition all nine justices to serve eighteen-year 
terms is sixteen years without the grandfather clause and fifty-two years with the grandfather clause). 
 79 To be clear, such an approach is not meant to cast off the risks associated with legal uncertainty per 
se; instead, it is meant to cast off the risk of institutional unpredictability. A legislator might reasonably 
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And while such substantive “backup” provisions are not common,
80
 nor 
are they novel or unprecedented—an important political and legal strength in 
this context. 
Case law (albeit limited) suggests that the Supreme Court would dutifully 
follow the prescribed instructions of a layered design.
81
 In Bowshar v. Synar, 
the Supreme Court faced a backup provision within the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act.
82
 Having determined that the Act as structured contained a 
constitutional infirmity, the Court reflected on some of the nettlesome 
severability questions raised by its decision.
83
 “Fortunately,” the Court 
observed, “this is a thicket we need not enter” for “[t]he language of the [Act] 
itself settles the issue.”
84
 
After noting that “Congress ha[d] explicitly provided ‘fallback’ provisions 
in the Act that take effect ‘[i]n the event . . . any of the reporting procedures 
. . . are invalidated,’”
85
 the Court held that “[t]he fallback provisions are ‘fully 
operative as a law’”
86
 and obviated any need for the Court to “perform the type 
 
believe a policy is constitutional while being skeptical (or just unsure) that the policy would survive 
judicial review given the current composition of the Court. 
80  Dorf, infra note 79, at 305 (“Less commonly, fallback law takes the form of substitute provisions . . . 
.”). 
 81 The Court also briefly discussed backup provisions in both McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) 
and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), but these references offer less persuasive precedent 
because the backup provisions at issue were irrelevant to the analysis. In McConnell, for example, 
the majority upheld “all applications of the primary definition and accordingly ha[d] no occasion to 
discuss the backup definition.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 n.73. Four Justices, meanwhile, would 
have held that both the primary and the backup provisions were invalid. See Michael C. Dorf, 
Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 307 n.12 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 277–78 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 337–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., and, in relevant part, Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 327–28 (“The Snowe–Jeffords Amendment operates as a backup provision that 
only takes effect if the Wellstone Amendment is invalidated.”). 
  Of course, one might see these discussions as partial support given that none of the Justices 
questioned whether the relevant backup provision was suspect based on its contingent nature. See, 
e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 337–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and, in relevant part, 
Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As I would invalidate § 203 under the primary 
definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision . . . . I would also invalidate 
the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition.”) (emphasis added). 
 82 See 478 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1986) (noting that the court’s holding “permits the fallback provisions to 
come into play”). 
 83 Id. at 734.  
 84 Id. at 735.  
 85 Id. at 735 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 274(f)(1)) (emphasis omitted). 
 86 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (quoting Champlin Refiining. Co. v. Corp. 
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932))). 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court’s references (and citations) to severability 
in Bowsher raise a broader point about first principles and the separation of 
powers.
88
 As Professor Michael Dorf observes in his essential work on the 
topic, substantive backup provisions are themselves a subset of a much 
broader category of “fallback law” that includes severability provisions.89 After 
all, a “truncated law is not simply smaller; it is also different from the original 
law.”
90
 Given that a normal severability analysis involves judicial speculation 
about what the legislature might have wanted,91 it would be odd to claim that 
courts are somehow “better situated than legislatures to make the policy-laden 




As Professor Dorf notes, “no workable system of judicial review could 
function without a large role for severability” and a categorical rejection of 
fallback law would be a radical (if not impossible) position for the Court to 
take.
93
 To the extent other meaningful objections exist to layering, I will address 
these in Part III.C. 
B. Political Safeguarding: Time v. Custom Appellate Procedures 
The second approach is to design a unique appellate procedure to govern 
challenges to the constitutionality of the court-reform package. Congress has 
the power to regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts pursuant to its 
 
 87 Id. at 736. 
88 See Dorf, supra note 81, at 306, n.11 (referencing how “[b]oth Buckley and Champlin Refining 
involved severability rather than substitutive fallback provisions”). 
89 See generally id. at 305. 
90 Id. As Professor Dorf discusses, “[the] point is easy to see in a case like United States v. Booker,” in 
which the Supreme Court held that “the portion of the [Federal Sentencing Guidelines] mandating 
the[ir] imposition . . . was severable.” Id. at 305–06. “After all, a regime of advisory guidelines 
operates very differently from a regime of mandatory ones. The new regime is not simply the old 
one minus some now-eliminated part; it has its own distinctive characteristics.” Id. at 306. 
91 Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 997, 1000 (2005) (stating 
that a court’s severability analysis “is guesswork by definition” and that “it is understandable for 
legislators to fear that the courts might guess wrong”). 
92 Dorf, supra note 81, at 370. 
 93 Id. at 310, 370 (discussing how “[a] real rule of nonseverability would treat any invalid provision of 
law as invalidating the entire legal code. Thus, real nonseverability is never an option for a court, and 
so, for courts as well as legislatures, the question is never whether to sever, but how much to sever or 
what kind of fallback to utilize.”). 
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powers under Article III, Section 1,
94
 and Congress has the power to regulate 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2.
95
 
There are two main reasons for Congress to exercise this power and craft 
custom-tailored appellate procedures for the review of court reform 
legislation. First, the typically slow pace of litigation combined with the Court’s 
default power of discretionary review gives the Court an unnecessary time 
advantage in the interbranch exchange. If the Justices believe their decision 
will be unpopular with the political coalition that enacted the reform package, 
the Court could delay any final ruling in the hopes that an intervening election 
will strengthen its hand by weakening the political coalition that sought to 
regulate it. Second, consolidating challenges and funneling them through a 
single court (or a single vertical chain of courts) is particularly helpful when 
backup provisions are in play to avoid a fracturing of lower-court decisions that 
might purport to trigger competing provisions.
96
 
To ensure that the political coalition that passed the law has a chance to 
respond to any potentially unexpected decisions by the Court (including 
wholesale invalidation), Congress should include several features in its reform 
bill. First, Congress should make the Supreme Court’s appellate review 
mandatory, carving out an exception to the Court’s default certiorari 
procedures.
97
 Second, Congress should funnel all challenges through a single 
venue such as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, if any lower court at 
all.
98
 Finally, Congress should require any court facing a challenge to the law to 
 
 94 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 95 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to 
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 96 See Dorf, supra note 81, at 309, 359–63. 
 97 The vast majority of cases filed at the Court fall within the Court's discretionary jurisdiction and are 
denied review at the certiorari stage. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (providing for direct appeal from 
three-judge district courts in a limited set of cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (indicating that courts 
of appeals cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court). 
 98 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A), (H) (requiring that constitutional challenges to certain trade 
agreement settlement systems “may be brought only in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit” and “shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of 
the United States”). Although allowing any court, such as the D.C. Circuit, to weigh in prior to the 
Supreme Court creates time-delay concerns, it may be worth having a disinterested (or at least “less 
interested”) set of judges examine and rule on the issues presented first. 
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advance the case to the front of its docket, carving out an exception to the 
general discretion vested in federal courts by the Priorities Act.
99
 
All of these are well-worn methods of appellate regulation, but the last—
forcing the Court to issue a prompt ruling—is particularly critical to safeguard 
Congress’s authority. Before 1984, Congress had enacted tens of dozens of 
“prioritization” provisions over the years,
100
 creating a patchwork of demands 
that became functionally impossible for federal courts to observe.
101
 With the 
Priorities Act,
102
 Congress largely wiped the slate clean, reserving only a handful 
of special cases for priority consideration
103
 and otherwise granting courts wide 
discretion to organize their dockets as they saw fit.
104
 And while congressional 
policy generally disfavors “the creation of any new civil priorities,”
105
 it seems 
 
 99 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1657 [hereinafter Priorities Act] (providing each federal court discretion on 
how civil actions are heard and determined, except for habeas corpus and recalcitrant witness 
actions). 
100 See Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (providing a list of enacted and amended 
“prioritization” provisions). 
101 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-985, at *7 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5779, 5784–85 
(discussing the newly amended prioritization laws and the difficulties presented by their 
implementation). 
102 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, each court of the United States shall 
determine the order in which civil actions are heard and determined, except that the court shall 
expedite the consideration of any action brought under chapter 153 or section 1826 of this title, any 
action for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, or any other action if good cause therefor is 
shown. For purposes of this subsection, ‘good cause’ is shown if a right under the Constitution of the 
United States or a Federal Statute (including rights under section 552 of title 5) would be maintained 
in a factual context that indicates that a request for expedited consideration has merit.”). 
103 See Freedom Commc’ns Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 157 F.R.D. 485, 486 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(“[C]ertain specific actions are named the highest priority civil actions—habeas corpus actions, 
recalcitrant witness actions and actions for preliminary or temporary injunctive relief. The Act 
encourages the courts to give special consideration to actions asserting federal rights. Regarding 
FOIA, the text states only that the rights granted by FOIA are among the federal rights worthy of 
special consideration. As there is no reason to suppose the converse, the special designation makes 
FOIA actions first among equals.”). 
104 See id. (“[T]he 1984 Act repealed some eighty individual prioritization provisions and enacted 
section 1657. . . . The Act grants a court wide discretion to organize its docket.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D 
Trial § 22 (2020) (“The federal statute concerning the priority of civil actions grants the court wide 
discretion to organize its docket, and it is procedurally proper for a party to move for an expedited 
consideration under the statute, as Congress contemplated case-by-case decision making.”). 
105 H.R. REP. NO. 98-985, at 4 (1984). Interestingly, providing expedited consideration to a wider range 
of statutes could be one strategy to raise the profile and urgency of the court-reform debate by forcing 
the Court to grapple with Democratic policies sooner rather than later. See Mark Tushnet 
(@Mark_Tushnet), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2020, 9:39 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Mark_Tushnet/status/1317822571941953537 et seq. (proposing such a 
procedure for fast-tracking judicial review). 
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fair to say that finalizing the structure of the Supreme Court itself should be 
priority number one. 
Given Congress’s explicit constitutional authority to regulate the appellate 
procedures of the Supreme Court, such a prioritization requirement hardly 
seems subject to challenge.
106
 Federal courts have routinely observed the 
Priorities Act’s requirements in managing their dockets,
107
 and a mere 
prioritization command raises none of the more complex questions posed by 
legislation that imposes time limits on judicial decision-making.
108
 
*               *               * 
By layering its substantive policies in a series of contingent provisions and 
setting out a bespoke appellate process to govern any challenges to those 
provisions, Congress has the power to reject an institutionally passive posture 
in its interbranch dialogue with the Supreme Court. None of the proposals 
above tread new ground or challenge the Court’s prerogative to review the 
constitutionality of Congress’s legislation; instead, they merely set aside 
assumptions about the transition to a new judicial design that have 
unnecessarily constrained the scholarly and legislative imagination. 
III. A LAYERED PROPOSAL FOR SUPREME COURT REFORM 
Building on these insights and approaches, I provide a sample reform 
proposal in Section A, discuss the benefits and risks of the layers offered in 
Section B, and evaluate some of the potential objections to the layered 
structure as a whole in Section C. 
 
 106 See, e.g., Zukowski v. Howard, Needles, Tammen, & Bergendoff, 115 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Colo. 1987) 
(discussing the constitutional authority for the Priorities Act). 
 107 See, e.g., Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC v. Nebraska, 733 F. App’x. 871, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2018) (granting 
motion for expedited appeal brought in part under the Priorities Act where plaintiff sought to enjoin 
Nebraska from using drugs produced by plaintiff in an execution); Van Hollen v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, Nos. 12-5117, 12-5118, 2012 WL 1758569, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2012) (citing Priorities 
Act when granting expedited appeal); Kiyemba v. Bush, Nos. 08-5424, 08-5425, 08-5426, 08-5427, 
08-5428, 08-5429, 2008 WL 4898963, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008) (expediting appeals under 
Priorities Act); In re Hicks, 118 F. App’x. 778, at *1 (4th Cir. 2005) (invoking the Priorities Act as a 
reason to order the lower court to act on a prisoner’s habeas petition); Serono Lab’ys, Inc. v. Shalala, 
No. 97-5188, 1998 WL 744103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 1998) (citing Priorities Act when granting 
expedition); Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to the Priorities Act 
in an order granting a motion to expedite an appeal of a preliminary injunction decision). 
108  See, e.g., William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial 
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 807–10 (1997) (outlining objections to time limits being imposed 
on courts' consideration of cases). 
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A. Regularizing Appointments & Restoring Jurisdiction 
The proposal uses three layers of policy to advance two primary goals: 
regularizing appointments to the Court and reining in the Court’s discretionary 
jurisdiction. As discussed in Part II.B., any challenges to the Act should be 
advanced to the front of the docket and be subject to mandatory appeal either 
directly to the Supreme Court or via the D.C. Circuit. 
1. Layer One 
To regularize appointments and prevent partisan capture of the Court, the 
Act would designate Justices (including sitting Justices) who have served 
eighteen years as “senior Justices.” The Act would also set a confirmation 
timetable to approve nominations in each odd-numbered year, with senior 
Justices automatically filling vacant seats until the next scheduled appointment. 
In other words, Justices Thomas and Breyer would immediately become 
senior Justices while continuing to serve in their own vacant seats. (If Congress 
passed the Act in 2021, for example, President Biden would fill Thomas’s seat 
in 2021 and Breyer’s seat in 2023.) Senior Justices would continue to serve by 
designation on the courts of appeals. 
To temper the Court’s discretionary control over its own docket and to 
reduce its ability to actively shape doctrine through strategic case selection, the 
Act would also reinvigorate the courts’ of appeals certification power. As 
Professors Craig S. Lerner and Nelson Lund have suggested, Congress should 
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1254 to include a provision that “each Term, the number 
of cases taken by the Supreme Court pursuant to the first paragraph 
(discretionary certiorari petitions) may not exceed the number of cases taken 
pursuant to the second paragraph (court of appeals certifications).”
109
 
If the Supreme Court invalidates any provision within Layer One, the 
entire layer would become inoperable and Layer Two would take effect as 
operative law. 
2. Layer Two 
The next continent layer would retain the same policy goals as the first 
layer but reflect a more constitutionally robust structure. 
 
 109 Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2010). 
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To regularize appointments the Act would follow a model proposed by 
Professor Jack Balkin, in which Congress creates two en banc courts: one 
consisting of all active Justices to decide cases under the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, and one consisting of the nine Justices most junior in service to 
decide cases under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
110
 Appointments would, 
again, take place in every odd-numbered year, ensuring that nearly all cases 
arising under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction are heard by a set of nine 
Justices, each serving eighteen years. Although the total size of the Court would 
admittedly expand under this model, the number of Justices hearing the 
Court’s most important cases would remain at nine. 
To even more rigorously ensure that the Court’s discretionary control over 
its agenda was not used to pursue aggressively partisan ends, this layer would 
also include a modification of the Court’s certiorari procedures. Rather than 
the Court’s informal “Rule of Four” (which states that the Court will grant 
certiorari to any petition receiving four votes), the Act would impose a new 
supermajority rule requiring a two-thirds vote to deny certiorari. Although the 
logic behind this approach will be discussed below, such a supermajority rule 
might marginally reduce the Court’s agenda-setting power. 
If the Supreme Court invalidated any provision within Layer Two, the 
entire layer would become inoperable and Layer Three would take effect as 
operative law. 
3. Layer Three 
The third layer would retain the same policy goals as above but provide 
the strongest possible constitutional foundation as a final backup. 
To regularize appointments, the Act would do away with any fixed number 
of Justices or bifurcated court structure. Instead, two seats would be 
automatically added to the Court at the start of any presidential term in which 
there were no pre-existing vacancies.
111
 In short, the size of the Court would 
 
 110 See BALKIN, supra note 24 at 152–53 (proposing judicial reforms); see also Jack M. Balkin, Don’t 
Pack the Court. Regularize Appointments, BALKINIZATION (Oct 5, 2020), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/dont-pack-court-regularize-appointments.html; Jennings & 
Acharya, supra note 4, at 414 (“The only jurisdiction Article III mandates that the Supreme Court 
have is its original jurisdiction.”). 
111  For a similar suggestion, see Daniel Hemel, Can Structural Changes Fix the Supreme Court?, 35 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 119, 136–37 (2021) (advocating for a “decoupling” of appointments and retirements 
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automatically expand and contract to ensure that each term the president 
could fill two vacancies. As above, confirmations could be scheduled to take 
place in every odd-numbered year. 
And given the increased capacity that this expanded structure would 
provide to hear cases under the full court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Act 
would require a unanimous vote to deny certiorari. 
B. Policy Benefits & Objections 
The structure above offers a pair of policies that would proportionally 
respond to recent norm violations, immediately establish a stable new norm, 
provide no partisan advantage over time, rely on historical practices for 
constitutional authority, and redress troubling judicial and political trends that 
have caused bipartisan concern over recent decades. And the particular layers 
proposed would allow for all actors (Republican and Democratic; legislative 
and judicial) to converge on a new institutional consensus that respects their 
varying perspectives, interests, and constitutional duties. 
1. Regularizing Appointments 
The first policy advanced by the proposal is to regularize the appointment 
process, ensuring that each president has an equal opportunity to appoint two 
Justices following every presidential election and that senators have a chance 
to influence the confirmation process of one Justice following every 
congressional election. This policy would respond to trends that have drawn 
concern from both sides of the aisle over the past several decades and restore 
an equilibrium more consistent with historical practice. 
From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court was structured 
to strike a careful balance: Justices needed to be insulated from political 
pressures to ensure decisional independence (i.e., the “ability to issue a ruling 
without fear of sanctions”)
112
 but also needed to remain sufficiently in touch 
with society to prevent the emergence of a powerful and unaccountable 
juristocracy. 
 
and the addition of “two justices at the beginning of each [presidential] term, regardless of how many 
vacancies have occurred or will occur”). 
 112 Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472; see also Jackson, supra note 60, at 967–68 
(describing the degrees to which certain accountability mechanisms and political responses to 
unpopular rulings undermine and promote judicial independence). 
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As a matter of constitutional design, “[t]he language and history of the 
Good Behavior Clause, viewed in the light of the circumstances of the time,” 
struck this balance fairly well.
113
 On the one hand, judges received an explicit 
promise of undiminished salary and an implicit promise of life tenure (at least 
according to the most common readings).
114
 On the other hand, the 
appointments process itself provided a “direct and important formal source of 
democratic control,” given average life expectancy at the time.
115
 Between 1789 
and 1970, Justices served an average of fifteen years, which allowed vacancies 
on the Court to open up once every two years.
116
 
This design—with its regular infusion of new judges—ensured that the 
Supreme Court could not become “completely divorced from democratic 
accountability.”
117
 After all, the system could have been designed “to allow the 
Justices to elect their own successors,” but “we do not allow the Justices to pick 
their own successors . . . precisely because we believe that the judiciary, just 
like the legislature and the executive, needs to be subject to popular control 
and to the system of checks and balances.”
118
 
The Constitution also provides Congress extensive control over the 
structure and design of the judiciary as a whole
119
—powers that Congress used 
early and often to foster public trust, to promote democratic legitimacy, and 
to prevent the Justices from becoming too isolated from society.
120
 The most 
 
113 Cramton, supra note 57, at 1316. 
114 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven 
D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 89 (2006) (observing that “[m]odern 
judges, scholars, and politicians” tend to assume that “the term ‘good Behaviour’ was merely a code 
phrase or term of art meaning ‘life tenure,’” and then disputing this reading of the “good Behaviour” 
clause). 
115 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 810. 
116 Id. at 775. 
 117 Id. at 813. 
 118 Id. at 812. But see infra text accompanying notes 124–130 (describing the practice of timing 
retirements to influence the ideological agenda of successor). 
 119 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (describing the structure of the judicial branch). 
 120 See Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 67, 93 (2019) (noting that circuit riding was 
meant to “increase the public’s sense of the legitimacy of the federal judiciary”); see also Joshua Glick, 
On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 
1754, 1761 (2003) (noting that one of the justifications behind circuit riding was to “enhance[] the 
justices’ ability to contribute to the formation of national law by exposing them to local political 
sentiments and legal practices”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit 
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obvious early example was the requirement that the Justices sit regularly with 
district court judges throughout the country to decide cases, a practice known 
as “riding circuit” and thought to encourage these values.
121
 But “riding circuit” 
is by no means the only example; Congress has long exercised a power to 




Over the past fifty years, however, the power of the Court has grown while 
the regular confirmation and appointment process has collapsed. Before 
1970, Justices served an average of 15 years.
123
 Since 1970, Justices have served 
an average of 26 years.
124
 The increased power and longevity of the Justices has 
transformed a consistent and necessary source of democratic legitimacy into a 
disturbing ritual where judges and politicians alike now work in tandem to gain 
 
Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388–89 (2006) (proposing that Justices of the 
present day be required to ride circuit for a four-week session in July so that they stay in touch with 
popular opinion). 
 121 See Levy, supra note 120, at 93 (“[B]y adjudicating cases and spending time in towns and cities outside 
of Washington D.C., the Justices were to become more familiar with the laws and customs of different 
localities.”); see also Calabresi & Presser, supra note 120, at 1386 n.1 (quoting 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 
125–26 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith)) (“Sir, in a country like this, it is of some importance that 
your judges should ride the circuits . . . that they may not forget the genius and temper of their 
government.”); id. at 1386–87 n.2 (quoting 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826) (statement of Rep. Buchanan)) 
(“If the Supreme Court should ever become a political tribunal, it will not be until the Judges shall 
be settled in Washington, far removed from the People, and within the immediate influence of the 
power and patronage of the Executive.”); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride 
Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1710–11 n.1 (2007) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 596 (1848) (statement of Sen. Badger regarding a bill that would have ended the practice of 
circuit riding)) (“[W]e shall have these gentlemen as judges of the Supreme Court . . . not felt, and 
understood, and realized as part and parcel of this great popular Government; but sitting here alone—
becoming philosophical and speculative in their inquires as to law . . . unseen, final arbiters of justice, 
issuing their decrees as it were from a secret chamber—moving invisibly amongst us, as far as the 
whole community is concerned; and, in my judgment, losing in fact the ability to discharge their duties 
as well as that responsive confidence of the people, which adds so essentially to the sanction of all 
acts of the officers of Government.”). 
 122 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 120, at 71–72 (discussing a “tradition of fluidity within the court structure”); 
see generally Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 81 (1996) (discussing how three-judge district courts “significantly affect the 
functioning of the American political system”). 
 123 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 775. 
 124 Id. at 771. Calabresi and Lindgren track from 1970 to 2005. Id. The average has remained steady 
since then. It is 25.6 from 1970–2000; and it remains at 26.1 if one omits Justice Souter who took 
senior status after roughly 18 years—an unusual step by modern standards. Id. at 795 n.75. 
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From the judicial side, it is no secret that Justices (and judges) strategically 
time their retirements to influence the ideological agenda of the successor to 
their seat.
126
 And this “soft” form of judicial control may be sharpening. Justice 
Kennedy, it is reported, suggested to President Trump that he consider Brett 
Kavanaugh for the “next” Supreme Court opening.
127
 Once Trump added 
Kavanaugh’s name to his public list of potential picks, Justice Kennedy then 
retired—creating a space for his chosen successor to ascend to his seat.
128
 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s final “most fervent wish”—to “not be 
replaced until a new president is installed”
129
—was a rare, public expression of 
a trend that is widely recognized but rarely appreciated for its constitutional 
implications.
130
 If judges are not supposed to select their own successors,
131
 then 





 125 Acknowledging that judges are not (and cannot be) genuinely “neutral” or “nonpartisan” in any kind 
of objective sense does not undermine (and, in fact, enhances) the importance that judges be broadly 
representative for the operation of law to be (and be viewed as) legitimate. 
126 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 841 (calling for an end to this practice); Carrington & 
Cramton, supra note 57 (noting the incentives supporting the practice); Judith Resnik, Judicial 
Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 
615 (2005). To be sure, this “timing” is not always successful. See Cramton, supra note 57, at 1322 
(“Justice Black attempted to survive the Nixon presidency, and Justice Douglas attempted to survive 
both Nixon and then Ford, but both Justices failed. Justices Brennan and Marshall attempted to 
survive Reagan, and they also failed.”). 
 127 Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy Asked Trump to Put Kavanaugh on Supreme Court List, Book 
Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2019, 3:03 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-asked-trump-to-put-kavanaugh-
on-supreme-court-list-book-says/2019/11/21/3495f684-0b0f-11ea-8397-a955cd542d00_story.html. 
 128 Id. 
 129 John Nichols, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: ‘My Most Fervent Wish Is That I Will Not Be Replaced Until 
a New President Is Installed,’ NATION (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-fervent/. 
 130 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2312, 2314 (2006) (drawing attention to how “the invisibility of political parties has left constitutional 
discourse about separation of powers with no conceptual resources to understand basic features of 
the American political system” and has “generated judicial decisions and theoretical rationalizations 
that float entirely free of any functional justification grounded in the actual workings of separation of 
powers”). 
 131 See supra text accompanying notes 112–118. 
 132 See supra text accompanying notes 136–130. 
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From the political side, the picture has been more complicated. On the 
one hand, the increased lifespan and power of the Justices significantly raises 
the stakes of every appointment.
133
 And, with the “democratic instillation of 
public values on the Court through the selection of new judges” becoming 
“infrequent and irregular,”
134
 confirmation hearings have become partisan life-
or-death events as senators seek to impact the political skew of the judicial 
branch as much as possible before the brief “window” for influence closes.
135
 
On the other hand, the availability of Supreme Court vacancies has—at least in 
recent history
136
—remained outside political control. 
That is not to say the system has not been unrepresentative. But the source 
of that unrepresentative skew in recent history has been a product of dumb 
luck or judicial manipulation of vacancy-timing. For example, “Presidents Taft 
and Harding made six and four Supreme Court appointments, respectively, 
while Woodrow Wilson made only three appointments despite serving longer 
as President than both Taft and Harding combined.”
137
 Similarly, Richard 
Nixon appointed four Justices over five years, while Jimmy Carter appointed 




 133 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that giving Supreme Court justices life tenure has 
resulted in a series of negative consequences); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 771 (“[T]he 
combination of less frequent vacancies and longer tenures of office means that when vacancies do 
arise, there is so much at stake that confirmation battles have become much more intense.”). 
 134 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 811 (citing DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 44, at 1116–19) 
(“[Y]ears will pass without any openings and, suddenly, two, three, or even four seats may open up 
within the space of a few years, followed by another long period without any vacancies. When this 
happens, the party in power at that particular time has a disproportionate impact on the Supreme 
Court, which can again prevent the American people from being able regularly to check the 
Court . . . .”). 
 135 To be sure, without broader changes reining in the Supreme Court’s power, “determining the 
ideological character of the Supreme Court would remain an enormously high-stakes affair” even 
with regularized appointments. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 45. But regular appointments 
might be expected to at least lower those stakes, and that would be a marked improvement. See 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 836 (“The regularization of vacancies on the Court and the 
more frequent appointments to the Court would make each appointment less important politically 
and should have a net effect of reducing the politicization of the process.”). Novelty, after all, is a 
strong tool in cultivating attention. See G. Michael Parsons, Fighting for Attention: Democracy, Free 
Speech, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2157, 2202–03 (2020) (discussing how 
news media has historically used attention-grabbing headlines to stimulate reader interest and how 
inflammatory headlines are used today).  
 136 See Grove, Judicial Independence, note 1, at 505–17 (discussing the development of the negative 
norm against court-packing). 
 137 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 812. 
 138 Id. 
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These dynamics disrupted the constitutional balance between 
independence and representativeness, but at least that imbalance did not result 
from legislative manipulation. 
Senator McConnell’s recent maneuvering shattered this already-uneasy 
truce, deepening the unrepresentative skew of the Court. It is now the case 
that fifteen of the last twenty Supreme Court Justices have been nominated by 
Republicans,
139
 even though Republicans have lost the popular vote in seven 
of the last eight presidential elections.
140
 
Regularizing appointments to the Supreme Court through a statutory 
scheme that is immediately implemented fixes these dangerous trends, 
responds to the recent violation of norms to discourage future violations, 
implements a stable scheme going forward, and restores the appointment 
process’s traditional role as a constitutional check to maintain the judiciary’s 
balance between independence and accountability.
141
 
The three layers proposed by the plan follow the structure set out in Part 
II, with the most politically preferable policy set out in Layer One and the 
most constitutionally predictable policy set out in Layer Three. Because the 
literature already covers the “standalone” legality of various reform proposals, 
I will only engage with the legal arguments briefly below to help explain their 
relative ordering. 
i. Layer One: Requiring Senior Status After Eighteen Years 
From a political perspective, leading with an eighteen-year senior-status 
requirement carries several benefits. First, it brings the service of active Justices 
back in line with the average historical tenure of Justices and in line with the 




 139 Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2021). 
 140 Elaine Kamarck & John Hudak, How to Get Rid of the Electoral College, BROOKINGS (Dec. 9, 
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/12/09/how-to-get-rid-of-the-electoral-college/. 
 141 See Ryan, supra note 108, at 797 (“[J]udicial independence is not an end in itself, but rather a means 
of securing other goals, most notably that of ensuring that litigants and potential litigants will receive 
impartial judicial decisions[,] . . . preserv[ing] clear lines of public accountability for both the judicial 
and the political branches[,] . . . and reduc[ing] the risk of arbitrary decisions, something the Framers 
knew was critical to the judiciary’s legitimacy.”). 
 142 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58 at 775 (providing support for an eighteen-year term). 
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Second, it respects the political, social, and psychological attachment to 
having nine active Justices—a number fixed since 1869.
143
 Whether or not one 
believes the current manifestation of the Court (in its unrepresentative form) 
is worth “saving,”
144
 the more traditional and aspirational conception of the 
Court (as an institution kept broadly “small-r” republican through regular 
appointments) would be worth “saving.”145 And the more any new norm can to 
carry forward and communicate an earlier and more long-standing convention 
to help foster continued acceptance, the better. 
Finally, like the other policies below, a senior-status system operates over 
the long run with no clear partisan valence, meaning that legislators can adopt 
the reform behind a “veil of ignorance” as to its long-term effects.
146
 
 For these reasons, the concept of regularly rotating Justices off the bench 
at regular intervals—whether via constitutional “term limits” requiring actual 
retirement or via statutory service rotation requiring senior status—has been a 
consistently popular reform over time and across ideological constituencies.
147
 
Setting an eighteen-year senior-status requirement as “Layer One” also 
opens up a unique opportunity given our current political moment: Congress 
can enact the policy without including a grandfather clause to exempt sitting 
Justices. Although proposals usually include this clause to address legal 
concerns, the clause also serves a political purpose that one might consider 
 
 143 Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2020). 
 144 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 6 (“Asking ‘how to save the Supreme Court’ is asking the 
wrong question. For saving it is not a desirable goal; getting it out of the way of progressive reform 
is.”). 
 145 See id. at 35 (“Term limits are . . . distinct among personnel reforms in that their democratizing effect 
is systematic.”); Chilton, Epps, Rozema & Sen, supra note 78. 
 146 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–142 (1971) (explaining the concept of the “veil of 
ignorance”).  
 147 “Among the reforms [on offer], term[] limit[s] for Supreme Court Justices enjoy the most popular 
support.” Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 21 (citing New Poll Shows SCOTUS Term Limits Still 
Popular Across Party Lines, FIX THE COURT (June 10, 2020), https://fixthecourt.com/2020/06/latest-
scotus-term-limits-poll/ (finding that 77% of Americans support restrictions on length of service for 
Supreme Court Justices in 2019)); Jeffrey Rosen, What If We Wrote the Constitution Today?, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/what-if-we-could-
rewrite-constitution/617304/ (indicating bipartisan support for Supreme Court term limits); David R. 
Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1397, 1400 (2005) (quoting John M. Broder & Carolyn Marshall, White House Memos Offer 
Opinions on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A11) (“Even Chief Justice John Roberts 
argued in favor of term limits as a government lawyer.”). 
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valuable under normal political conditions: removing short-term partisan 
implications from the equation. 
On the heels of a unilateral norm violation by Republicans, however, full 
and immediate implementation of a senior-status requirement could be a 
political benefit rather than a political liability. Because Justice Thomas would 
typically be expected to “wait out” Biden’s term in office while Justice Breyer 
might be expected to retire, immediate implementation would provide a short-
term proportionate response to McConnell’s norm violation (by rotating 
Thomas out of active service) and long-term apolitical stability (by placing any 
other partisan consequences beyond the next presidential election). Removing 
the grandfather clause, in other words, ensures that a dangerous precedent is 




From a legal perspective, the constitutionality of a mandatory senior-status 
requirement is at least plausible—and perhaps stronger than traditionally 
assumed.
149
 To start, senior Justices still exercise the judicial power, still hear 
cases, still exercise decisional independence in resolving those cases, still 
receive full compensation, and arguably maintain the same “office” despite the 
 
 148 See generally David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
949, 955 (2019) (“[S]ome of the most morally and democratically compelling forms of anti-hardball 
may be unattainable without the aid of hardball . . . .”); see also Jurecic & Hennessey, supra note 3 
(“All of these ideas [18-year terms, supermajorities, etc.] could help place the Court at arm’s length 
from politics and restore its authority, but it’s hard to imagine why Republicans would assent to such 
proposals unless the party knew that Democrats were willing to play hardball right back.”).  
     By omitting a grandfather clause, the proposed plan goes further than the typical 18-year term 
proposals. Some might (understandably) say that even this isn’t sufficiently responsive or adequately 
deterrent. Yet the disparate treatment of Garland and Barrett offers the most indisputable offense—
one that provides the clearest example of a shared norm violation and the strongest justification for 
a corrective response. 
     Moreover, the fact that both Roberts and Alito would be “next up” after Thomas and Breyer 
means Democrats would have the opportunity make more substantial inroads after the next 
presidential election (moving from 6-3 now, to 5-4 in one term, and 3-6 after two terms) and 
Republicans would have a chance to protect their majority (moving 6-3 now, to 5-4 in one term, and 
5-4 after two terms).  
   It should be noted that a two-year “gap” would be required in 2033 to allow Justice Gorsuch to 
serve 18 years. 
 149 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that a Justice’s “life tenure” can be read to include 
service that starts “in the Supreme Court and moved to a lower court or vice versa”). But see Calabresi 
& Lindgren, supra note 58, at 858–859 (identifying weaknesses in Carrington and Cramton’s 
proposal).  
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specific terms of that office not remaining constant over time.
150
 As the 
Supreme Court suggested in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 
decisional independence is the constitutional core of judicial independence: 
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need 
for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any 
phase of the decisional function. But it is quite another matter to say that each 




And while riding circuit consistently over the course of one’s career is 
different than riding circuit sequentially over the course of one’s career, the 
relevant question is whether this distinction is of such constitutional weight that 
the Good Behavior Clause prohibits Congress from enacting such a law.
152
 
There are good reasons to believe legal objections based on the Good 
Behavior Clause are weaker than the literature typically imagines. First, judicial 
manipulation of appointments through strategic retirement, while lamented as 
“unseemly,” is typically considered orthogonal to the question of 
constitutionality.
153
 But given that the appointments process itself is supposed 
to operate as a check on judicial power, a decision by Congress to safeguard 
this check in a way that both honors decisional independence and combats 
strategic retirements seems appropriate. 
Second, when a convention associated with judicial independence is “not 
clearly etched into our constitutional text and structure” but is merely 
“constructed by political institutions over time,”
154
 a violation of one set of 
existing norms may require changes to another set of adjacent norms to 
 
 150 Myths and Facts About SCOTUS Term Limits, FIX THE COURT (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://fixthecourt.com/2019/11/myth-facts-scotus-term-limits/; 28 U.S.C. § 371 (stating that judges 
that take senior status “retain the office”). But see generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are 
Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (addressing the constitutionality 
of senior judges). 
 151 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970); see also Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472 (defining judicial 
independence as decisional independence); Jackson, supra note 60, at 967–68 (discussing selection 
and tenure rules that contribute to judicial independence). 
 152 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that the Good Behavior Clause does not so 
prohibit Congress). See also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (upholding power of 
Congress to require Supreme Court Justices to sit as lower court judges). 
 153 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 841 (describing the practice as unseemly and as causing 
the public to view the Court as political). 
 154 Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 470; see also JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 102–07 (2017) 
(discussing the early development of—and contests around—judicial structuring norms). 
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reestablish institutional stability and prevent constitutional backsliding overall. 
In other words, even if an eighteen-year senior-status requirement might seem 
like it violates the Good Behavior Clause given past practice, the constitutional 
weight of that practice cannot be easily separated from related practices that 
fulfilled a supporting role. 
Finally, the principle of judicial independence is itself protected by broader 
structural safeguards; namely, Article I’s constitutional requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment.
155
 Over the course of our country’s history, 
these structural safeguards have provided the first line of defense against 
targeted jurisdiction-stripping efforts
156
 and have provided stability to the design 
of the federal court system overall. The very fact that the Judiciary is so 
dependent on Congress for its structure and jurisdiction is, arguably, a vital 
source of its democratic legitimacy.
157
 
In short, if both the President and majorities in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate have decided that a change to the structure of 
the federal court system is required in light of recent events to stabilize and 
protect the impartiality, legitimacy, and independence of the judiciary, the 
Supreme Court should be particularly cautious before imposing its own 
implicit rule based on a more formal, practice-driven conception of 
 
 155 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 873 (“[T]he primary protection for many of our 
most precious rights and liberties (of which the independent judiciary forms a crucial part) would be 
structural.”). Traditionally, “scholars have assumed either that there must be judicially enforceable 
limits on Congress’s power, or that there are no constitutional limits and the federal judicial power is 
simply a matter of legislative will (or benevolence).” Id. As Professor Grove points out, this overlooks 
how other structural features, such as bicameralism and the presidential veto, protect federal 
jurisdiction. 
   Interestingly, the executive branch has also historically played a role in constraining jurisdiction-
stripping efforts. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 250, 251–55, 268–86 (2012) (describing the executive branch’s efforts in protecting 
the scope of federal jurisdiction). 
 156 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 929 (showing that the Court has, appropriately, 
“indicated a willingness to enforce the jurisdictional limitations that survive the Article I lawmaking 
process”).  
 157 As Professor Grove notes, this has “strong normative underpinnings.” Id. (“[T]he very existence of a 
congressional power to limit federal jurisdiction can serve to legitimize judicial decisions. [As] 
Professor Black explained: ‘Jurisdiction’ is the power to decide. If Congress has wide and deep-going 
power over the courts’ jurisdiction, then the courts’ power to decide is a continuing and visible 
concession from a democratically formed Congress.’ Thus, when Congress . . . leaves federal 
jurisdiction in place, it signals (by its forbearance) that it has decided to trust certain matters to the 
independent federal judiciary.”). 
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“independence” arguably at odds with a deeper fidelity to the purposes 
underlying the structure of Article III and the Constitution as a whole. 
ii. Layer Two: Bifurcating Original & Appellate Jurisdiction 
The advantage of layering policies, of course, is that Congress can express 
a potential constitutional disagreement with the Court without forfeiting its 
institutional power in the process. Because the runaway power of the Court is 
itself a reason for reform, Layer Two ensures that the political will to achieve 
regular appointments does not go to waste. 
From a political perspective, structuring the Supreme Court so that only 
the nine most junior Justices hear cases under the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction carries almost all the benefits described above. And while the 
overall number of active Justices on the Court will swell beyond nine, original 
jurisdiction cases only constitute a fraction of the Court’s docket.
158
 
Perhaps one might object that the structure of the plan is more 
complicated than court-packing or even a senior-status requirement,
159
 but that 
could be as much of a political benefit as a political risk. The “takeaway” is 
that nine Justices will continue to hear virtually all of the Supreme Court’s 
cases and those nine Justices will serve in that capacity for eighteen years. The 
burden of explaining any complexities beyond that would seem to fall most 
heavily on those objecting to the design. 
From a legal perspective, the measure seems strong but not without doubt. 
The idea of limiting the Supreme Court to its original jurisdiction relies on a 
widely accepted understanding of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,
160
 and 





 158 See Balkin, supra note 110 (proposing a system in which a new Supreme Court Justice is appointed 
in every odd-numbered year); see also Jurisdiction: Original, Supreme Court, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-original-supreme-court (last accessed June 
25, 2021) (“The Supreme Court's original docket has always been a minute portion of its overall 
caseload.”). 
 159 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 62 (“What only law professors can understand, a popular 
movement will never demand.”). 
 160 Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 414 (“The only jurisdiction Article III mandates that the 
Supreme Court have is its original jurisdiction.”). 
 161 Levy, supra note 120, at 71–72; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 46 (authorizing circuit courts to sit in panels). 
Another approach might be to create a separate intermediary “Supreme Court of Appeals” between 
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Still, one might object to the idea that this “tradition of fluidity” exists to 
quite the same extent for the Supreme Court (given its constitutional stature) 
and that Congress therefore cannot functionally strip only some Justices of 
their appellate jurisdiction.
162
 Moreover, this kind of split might be viewed as 
inconsistent with the text of Article III, which refers to the judicial power being 
vested in “one supreme Court.”
163
 
While this objection brings us into uncharted (or at least academic) 
territory, adding a final, third layer provides an extra degree of comfort to the 
aggregate reform package. 
iii. Layer Three: Automatically Adding Seats 
The final approach—automatically adding seats at regular, predetermined 
intervals—is a kind of “court-packing lite.” From a political perspective, 
legislators might find it unenticing as a first layer but more acceptable as a third 
layer. A Member of Congress otherwise attached to the norm of nine Justices, 
for example, might be open to an expanded Court knowing that the policy 
would only activate if the Court itself rejects all other options. 
Such an approach also avoids the political risk of escalation that could 
come from a one-time attempt to expand the Court.
164
 An immediately 
implemented “automatic additions” plan proportionally responds to past 
abuse while promising political opponents a fair and equal opportunity to 
influence future appointments after the next round of elections. This could 
 
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, although populating the seats of this court raises its own 
unique complexities. 
 162 To be sure, this form of generalized jurisdiction-stripping does not raise the kind of “decisional 
independence” questions, see infra note 226 (discussing Klein), or other “improper motive” 
questions that often accompany jurisdiction-stripping, e.g., Fallon, supra note 67, at 1074–83 
(stripping jurisdiction from federal courts on the assumption that state courts will not only be more 
favorable to certain types of claims, but that this favorability will encourage state courts to openly defy 
prior Supreme Court precedents). But, then again, lawyers—and Justices—are nothing if not creative. 
163  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 979 n.272 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, The Exceptions Clause] (providing 
examples of Members of Congress and the Court disfavoring a panel system on the Supreme Court 
based on the provision that there be “one supreme Court”). 
 164 Klarman, supra note 72, at 242 (“[R]eciprocal hardball can play into the hands of authoritarians by 
alienating moderates, unifying autocratic forces, and even providing a pretext for government 
repression.”). 
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To be sure, this floating approach to composition could regularly lead to 
an even number of Justices. One might reasonably object that the Supreme 
Court should have an odd number so that the institution as a whole can speak 
with one voice on most questions that come before it. Yet this raises important 
normative questions about what role the Supreme Court can and should play 
in society—questions to which we now turn. 
2. Restoring Jurisdiction 
Apart from the personnel changes above, coalitions from across the 
political spectrum have proposed reining in the institutional power of the 
Supreme Court over the years.
166
 And while these proposals normally take the 
form of jurisdiction-stripping, some scholars have suggested another remedy: 
“giving the Supreme Court more to do, not less.”
167
 
The second policy advanced by the layered the proposal, then, is to 
incrementally decrease the Supreme Court’s discretion over its case-selection 
process. While not immediately intuitive, jurisdiction-restoring as a method 
for disempowering the Court has strong political and legal advantages over 
jurisdiction-stripping. 
For more than the first hundred years of its existence, the Supreme Court 
had no control over which cases it would decide.
168
 For the Framers, 
mandatory jurisdiction provided a powerful reply to those who feared the 
emergence of an “imperial judiciary.”
169
 In the Antifederalist Papers, Brutus 
warned of Justices that were too independent: “[T]hey are independent of the 
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in 
this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven 
 
 165 See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152 (stating that a proposal to reform the Court “needs to 
be stable going forward” and consist of something that “both sides might be able to live with in the 
long term, leading to a fair equilibrium”).  
 166 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 64 (“[D]isempowering reforms can cut across existing partisan 
configuration.”).  
 167 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1283; see BALKIN, supra note 24, at 154–55 (arguing that making 
the Court “decide more cases, not less . . . may limit the Justices’ ability to shape litigation 
campaigns.”).  
 168 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ 
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2000). 
 169 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1262. 
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 Hamilton, responding in the Federalist Papers as Publius, wrote that 
the judiciary should not be feared, for it could “take no active resolution 
whatsoever” and had “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”
171
 
And, for a time, this characterization held. The early Supreme Court did 
not control its docket, could only act on the cases that came before it, and 
resolved all the cases that came before it, playing more of an “error-correction” 
role than a “law-declaration” role.
172
 In the pre-Marshall Court, for example, 
71% of reported opinions were brief and without attributed authorship, and 
the Court issued opinions within days (or at most weeks) of oral argument.
173
 
Mandatory jurisdiction also underpins the traditional justification for 
judicial review; namely, that “the power of judicial review rests . . . upon the 
constitutional duty of the judiciary ‘to say what the law is.’”174 As Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, “Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. . . . So if a 
law be in opposition to the constitution . . . the court must determine which of 
these conflicting rules governs the case.”
175
 This, Marshall proclaimed, was “the 
very essence of judicial duty.”
176
 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court’s workload swelled beyond its 
capacity. Between 1874 and 1924, the Court heard more than 200 or even 
250 cases per year,
177
 and in the five years between 1917 and 1922, the Court 
heard an average of 330 cases per term.
178
 In short, the size of the Court’s 
 
 170 THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No. 15, at 222, 223 (Brutus) (Morton Borden ed., 1965). 
 171 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 172 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44–
56 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Vertical Maximalism] (discussing the error correction role of the early 
Supreme Court). 
 173 See Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1277. 
 174 Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 
517, 518 (1966) (emphasis in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)); see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1996) (“The power to interpret 
the laws is an incident to this case- or controversy-deciding function; courts must interpret because 
they must decide.”). 
 175 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78. 
 176 Id. at 178. 
 177 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1268. 
 178 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1646 n.12. 
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docket eventually reached a point where full (or even mostly) mandatory 
jurisdiction became practically untenable.
179
  
Eventually, Congress stepped in to alleviate the issue, rendering most of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction discretionary in the so-called “Judges’ Bill” 
of 1925, and eliminating almost all remaining mandatory jurisdiction in 
1988.
180
 This allowed the Court to alter its “manner of speaking” over time to 
“emphasize[] the enunciation of doctrine over the resolution of disputes,”
181
 
definitively shifting the Supreme Court’s overall role in the constitutional 
scheme from error-correction to law-declaration.
182
 
Since this shift, the Supreme Court has steadily reduced the number of 
cases it decides on the merits. Rather than deciding up to 350 cases per year, 
the Supreme Court now typically decides “no more than 100 cases involving 
about 70–75 opinions for the Court.”
183
 At the same time, Congress also eased 
the relative workload of each case by doubling each Justice’s number of law 
clerks from two (prior to 1970) to four (in 1978).
184
 
Finally, the Justices “helped themselves” to more discretion soon after the 
Judges’ Bill passed, “extend[ing] [their] discretion by (among other things) 
claiming the power to issue limited writs of certiorari, by subjecting ostensibly 
mandatory appeals to discretionary review, and by practically eliminating the 




 179 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1987) 
(stating that with the “expansion of federal judicial business . . . working for the general coherence of 
the national legal system is the only possible function of the Court”).  
 180 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1646 n.10. 
 181 Strauss, supra note 179, at 1094–95.  
 182 See generally Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 172, at 44–59 (arguing that the Court better 
maintains its hierarchical role by focusing more on setting precedent than in resolving disputes in an 
individual case, as evidenced by a trend in the modern jurisprudence of the Court toward law-
declaration). 
 183 Cramton, supra note 57, at 1317. See also Supreme Court Cases, October Term 2019-2020, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_cases,_October_term_2019-
2020#:~:text=It%20is%20often%20referred%20to,during%20its%202019%2D2020%20term (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2020) (noting that between 2007 and 2019, the Court has released an average of 76 
cases per year). More recently, this number has moved into the 50s, but that may be related to Court’s 
current remote posture due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), 
TWITTER (Feb. 1, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/1356346603490185217 
et seq. 
 184 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 808. 
 185 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1704–05. 
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All of these developments over the last century have empowered the 
Court. Rather than resolving whatever cases come before it, the Court now has 
the power to “set its own agenda” and can treat cases as mere “vehicles” for 
taking up whatever social, political, or economic questions the Justices wish to 
address.
186
 Contrary to Hamilton’s reassurances, “[this] ability to set one’s own 
agenda is at the heart of exercising will.”
187
 
The more we have taken this aspect of the Court’s role for granted, the 
more law students, lawyers, judges, and politicians have shifted their 
expectations about the role of the Justices themselves and the propriety of 
assertive judicial intervention.
188
 And with increasing polarization among 
political elites the Justices have now sorted into defined partisan blocs,
189
 
encouraging ever-greater “celebrity” behavior.
190
 
To counter these trends, the proposed package incrementally decreases 
the discretion that a bare majority of the Justices hold over the decision to hear 
cases with each successive policy layer.
191
 This approach would encourage the 
Justices “to behave more like their counterparts on the inferior appellate 





 186 Id. at 1718–19, 1733–34. 
 187 Id. at 1718. 
 188 Id. at 1733 (“[T]he Court’s unbridled discretion to control its own docket, choosing not only which 
cases to decide, but also which ‘questions presented’ to decide, appears to have contributed to a 
mindset that thinks of the Supreme Court more as sitting to resolve controversial questions than to 
decide cases.”); id. at 1648 (stating that sweeping discretionary jurisdiction has “encouraged Supreme 
Court Justices to think of themselves less as deciders of cases and more as final arbiters of 
controversial questions” and “deeply shaped substantive constitutional law itself”). See also Grove, 
Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472 (describing the process by which students, practitioners, 
and judges are accultured to support certain conventions over time). 
 189 From 1790 until 1936, there were no “liberal and conservative blocs that fell along partisan lines as 
defined by the party of the president who appointed a Justice.” DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 25, at 
63. The “infrequency of dissent” may have been “partly a product of . . . the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction over the great majority of cases that came before it during its first century of operation.” 
Id. at 64. 
 190 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1259–60 (discussing the growing trend of “celebrity Justice” 
behaviors: long, unnecessary opinions and emphasizing culture war issues and pop philosophy in 
opinions over the resolution of cases). 
 191 A clarification: The Court current employs an informal “Rule of Four,” which gives some control to 
a bare minority of Justices. Because a minority cannot prevent cases, however, the ideological 
coalition in the majority holds the most agenda-setting power. See Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of 
Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981 (1957) (stating that, according to Justice Van Devanter, the Court 
always grants the certiorari petition when as many as four Justices think it should be granted). 
 192 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1273–74. 
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i. Layer One: The Certiorari/Certification Rule 
Professors Lerner’s and Lund’s proposal that the Supreme Court be 
required to take more cases via certification by the courts of appeals than by 
discretionary certiorari petitions would help decentralize the selection of the 
cases on the Court’s docket.
193
 
From a political perspective, this would help ensure that the Court’s docket 
is largely driven “by the perceived needs of the judicial system, as determined 
by the lower court judges themselves”
194
 and less driven by the ideological 
agendas of the Justices. In this respect, it carries some benefits of Professors 
Epps and Sitaraman’s more novel “lottery” approach without requiring a 
wholesale overhaul over the Supreme Court’s structure.
195
 The concept of 
“restoring” the Court’s jurisdiction is also likely to be less politically 
controversial than the concept of “stripping” the Court’s jurisdiction—an 
important factor in building political support for the overall reform package. 
On the other hand, one might fairly wonder: Given the benefits of layering 
for minimizing legal uncertainty, why not make jurisdiction-stripping “Layer 
One” and jurisdiction-restoring “Layer Two”? That is an option, but 
reformers should consider whether pairing such a reform with the 
appointment-regularizing reforms above might encourage the Supreme Court 
to strike down Layer One more readily than it might otherwise by giving the 
Court an alternative basis for its decision.
196
 The reason for pairing an 
appointment-regularizing policy with a jurisdiction-restoring policy is that only 
the former turns on judicial behavior that is genuinely unpredictable.
197
 
And that is because, from a legal perspective, the certification proposal 
presents little risk. In fact, such a proposal is more consistent both with 
Congress’s historical expectations about the Court’s appellate procedure and 
with the constitutional role of the Court itself. 
One early proposal for handling the Justices’ increased workload was to 
create circuit courts and then require those circuits to certify any question 
 
 193 Id. at 1289. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 183–84. 
 196 Congress could, of course, separate the two policies so that the elements of Layer One do not rise 
and fall together. 
 197 See Epps & Sitamaran, supra note 20, at 163 (arguing that public perception regarding how the 
Supreme Court comes to decisions gives rise to its legitimacy and increases the potential for the 
public to accept unpopular decisions). 
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decided differently by another circuit court.
198
 Instead, Congress settled on a 
design that would include both certification and certiorari, noting during the 




The Court soon went about undermining the certification function, 
however, by expressing hostility to certification and reading the role of 
certification narrowly.
200
 As Professor Edward Hartnett observes, certificates 
dropped off precipitously. From 1927 to 1936, the courts of appeals issued 
seventy-two certificates. From 1937 to 1946, that dropped to twenty. And 
between 1946 and 1985, the Court accepted four.
201
 “At this point, certification 
is practically a dead letter,”
202
 contrary to the expectations of the Congress that 
empowered the Court in the first place. 
At a more fundamental level, discretionary jurisdiction itself is a legislative 
creation—an exercise of Congress’s power to create exceptions to the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.”
203
 This is a profoundly powerful point in favor of using 
a jurisdiction-restoring approach. While the constitutionality of jurisdiction-
stripping becomes more dubious the more it disempowers the Court, the 
constitutionality of jurisdiction-restoring arguably becomes stronger the more 
it disempowers the Court. 
ii. Layer Two: The Two-Thirds Certiorari Rule 
Given the legal strength of the certiorari/certification rule, Layer One is 
likely to stand or fall based on the Supreme Court’s views on the 
constitutionality of the senior-status requirement. Assuming that the 
“bifurcated court” approach outlined above is constitutional, the question then 
becomes what jurisdiction-restoring approach is best suited to the new judicial 
structure. 
 
 198 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1651. 
 199 Id. at 1710. 
 200 Id. at 1710–12. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 1712. 
 203 See Grove, The Exceptions Clause, supra note 163, at 930–33, 952–59, 969–72. Some have 
questioned the compatibility of discretionary review with the power of judicial review itself. See 
Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 413 (citing Charles L. Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 845–46 (1975)). 
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To ensure that the “full” Court does not use its agenda-control power to 
pursue partisan ends or to otherwise manipulate the offerings available to the 
most-junior nine Justices, Layer Two would implement a new rule to govern 
petitions for certiorari. 
Today, the Supreme Court follows an informal “Rule of Four.” If at least 
four Justices support hearing a case, the Court will grant the petition for 
certiorari.
204
 Layer Two would replace this rule with a formal, inverted 
supermajority requirement: a petition would be granted unless two-thirds 
voted to deny certiorari.205 
Switching the default to grants while retaining a supermajority ability to 
reject petitions would prevent a bare majority from exercising agenda control 
and would move the institution as a whole marginally closer back towards the 
error-correction role that it historically occupied by increasing the likelihood 
of grants overall. To be sure, “even if the Court decided 150 or 200 cases per 
year . . . , it would dispose of only a fraction of its 9,000-case docket and could 
not possibly correct every error in lower court interpretations of federal law.”
206
 
We are well past the day when the Court could feasibly exercise full mandatory 




But the Court’s “error-correction” and “law-declaration” roles are less 
distinct categories so much as ends on a spectrum. The certiorari votes of 
individual Justices, for example, may reflect each Justice’s views about what 
institutional place on this continuum the Supreme Court should occupy.208 
Professors Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray suggest that 
Justice White’s frequent certiorari votes tended to reflect his own view that 
 
 204 Leiman, supra note 191. 
 205 Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 412, propose revising the Rule of Four and “requiring a 
majority—or six, seven, eight, or even all nine—of the Justices to agree to grant certiorari” to “permit 
minority perspectives on the Court to block cases that are likely to be the most ideologically, socially, 
or politically divisive.” Although this helps neutralize action on the most divisive cases, it might (1) 
leave splits standing and (2) further reduce the Justices’ workload, unintentionally encouraging 
grandstanding and partisan celebrity behavior. 
 206 Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 172, at 57. 
 207 See id. at 56–59 (“To fulfill its ‘supreme’ role in this judicial hierarchy, the Court must focus on 
establishing broad precedents, not on correcting isolated errors in lower court decisions.”). 
 208 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 423 (2004) (proposing 
that certiorari grant patterns reflect Justices’ views on whether the Court should utilize more of a 
“rule-articulating approach,” a “standard-setting approach,” or “an incrementalist approach”). 
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“[t]he function of a judge . . . is to decide cases, not to write essays or to 
expound theories,”
209
 while Justice Scalia’s less frequent votes reflected his view 




By imposing a new certiorari rule that automatically grants petitions unless 
a supermajority of the Justices denies the petition, Congress could weigh in on 
this debate and implement its own view that the Court should be more in the 
business of deciding cases and less in the business of setting rules—a 
systematically, if subtly, disempowering shift. 
iii. Layer Three: The Unanimous Certiorari Rule 
If the Justices invalidate both Layer One and Layer Two, the Supreme 
Court will grow well beyond its current size given the terms of Layer Three. 
With this expanded membership, the Supreme Court could handle a far 
greater workload, allowing it to move even closer to the error-correction end 
of the spectrum. 
For this reason, Layer Three would implement a unanimous certiorari 
rule, placing a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the Court granting petitions 
and resolving cases.
211
 Shifting to a rule that requires unanimity might also have 
additional benefits. 
First, an unanimity rule would end any attempt by the Justices to exercise 
the Court’s agenda-setting power in even minimally partisan ways given the 
dispersal of control. 
Second, it would create strong intra-institutional levers of power to 
encourage consensus both inside and outside the certiorari process itself. By 
granting individual Justices the power to marginally increase their colleagues’ 
workload, Congress could introduce a form of “judicial filibuster” into the 
Court’s internal deliberations. This procedural leverage could have a 
meaningful substantive impact, not only encouraging consensus around 
holdings, but even encouraging consensus around judicial culture and 
language. Individual Justices may be less likely to write a sarcastic takedown in 
 
 209 Id. at 429. 
 210 Id. at 425–27. 
 211 One might ask why not simply restore mandatory jurisdiction. First, even a greatly expanded Court 
likely could not resolve all the petitions that the Court receives in any given year. Second, giving the 
Court a “percolation” option may be useful to help develop the law and allow for a degree of flexibility 
that is useful in promoting constitutional stability. Id. at 437–39. 
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a concurring opinion or publicly wade into culture wars off the bench if they 
know their peers will punish such behavior with more work.
212
 
Third, by reducing the rewards of “celebrity” behavior and the power and 
prestige of the Court overall, these changes might rein in a related problem: 
circuit judges “auditioning” for a position on the Supreme Court.
213
 
In the end, Layer Three offers an approach that redefines both the size 
and function of the Supreme Court in a surprisingly disempowering way, given 
the proposal’s clear constitutional footing. 
C. Layering Objections 
With so many political and legal benefits associated with layered reform, 
why pursue any other approach? Unfortunately, there will always be some 
legal unpredictability surrounding any proposal, and the very process of 
layering policies introduces its own kind of uncertainty into the transition. 
While the constitutionality of fallback law in general seems secure enough 
to outweigh the uncertainties associated with various standalone plans, some 
potential legal objections remain, and there are more (and less) risky 
approaches to layering. I address these below. 
In the end, the only true insurance against the “tail risk” of complete 
invalidation is the combination of political safeguards discussed in Part II.B.: 
mandatory appeal, consolidated venue, and prioritization. By including these 
provisions in any reform package, Congress can protect its prerogative to 
respond to whatever action the Supreme Court takes. 
1. Legislative Duty 
In his article, Fallback Law, Professor Dorf suggests that contingent 
legislative design raises difficult theoretical questions about the legislator’s duty 
to exercise independent constitutional judgment, whether one subscribes to a 
Lincolnian view, a Dialectic view, or even a Judicial Exclusivity view.
214
 The 
conceptual tensions that Professor Dorf identifies are intriguing, and I 
commend readers to his excellent analysis. 
 
 212 See CARLY SIMON, You’re So Vain, on NO SECRETS (Elektra 1972) (“You’re so vain/You probably 
think this song is about you.”). 
 213 See Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1294 (arguing that changes “might even encourage some 
mediocre lower court judges to refrain from campaigning for a seat on the high court”). 
 214 Dorf, supra note 81, at 342–50. 
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For our more pedestrian purposes, however, Professor Dorf’s final 
takeaway puts to rest any concerns that legislators might have: the Supreme 
Court almost certainly will not invalidate legislation on this basis.
215
 To do so, 
the Court would need to strike down otherwise valid legislation based on a 
brand-new separation of powers doctrine built on an equally new 
constitutional theory. What theory? That the Supreme Court has the power 
to judicially enforce a legislative duty that itself requires legislators to “abide by 
their best guess about what the courts would do.”
216
 
As Professor Dorf concludes, “[m]erely to describe such possibilities is to 
explain why they are untenable as formal doctrines.”
217
 Even judicial 
supremacy does not require this kind of legislative groveling. 
2. Nondelegation 
With the nondelegation doctrine on the cusp of making a comeback,
218
 
might the Court hold that a layered design impermissibly delegates policy 
choices to the judiciary?
219
 
No. In a layered design, the Court is not being asked to craft policy or even 
to choose in its own discretion among various policy options. Rather, the 
Court must enforce a clear legislative policy: Layer One. If the Court holds 
that legislative policy is constitutionally deficient, it must enforce a different, 
clear legislative policy: Layer Two. 
 
 215 Id. at 350–51. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 351. 
 218 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]ince 1935, 
the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments . . . . If a majority of this Court were willing 
to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”); id. at 
2131–2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the provision of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (“SORNA”) authorizing the Attorney General to specify registration requirements 
violates the nondelegation doctrine); see also Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court 
Wants to Revive a Doctrine That Would Paralyze Biden’s Administration, SLATE (Dec. 1, 2020, 
12:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundy-doctrine-
administrative-state.html (explaining there are at least five justices who have indicated they would 
support a “revived nondelegation doctrine”). 
 219 See Dorf, supra note 81, at 326 (arguing that Congress does not violate the nondelegation doctrine 
when it enacts fallback laws). 
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Ironically, Congress delegates more implicit authority to the Judiciary 
when it declines to include severability guidance or other substitute law, as 
Bowsher v. Synar suggests.220 
3. Judicial Coercion 
The strongest objection to contingent design is that it could be used to 
coerce the Judiciary in a way that undercuts decisional independence.
221
 
Consider a plainly unconstitutional law backed up by an unrelated fallback 
provision that dramatically raises taxes or terminates a popular program.
222
 As 
Dorf notes, “[b]y including a highly undesirable fallback provision in 
legislation, the legislature can raise the cost of invalidation to the court.”
223
 
This kind of judicial coercion seems contrary to basic principles of 
decisional independence central to the exercise of judicial power. And the 
principle that coerced acts are void or illegitimate “is about as basic as legal 
principles get.”
224
 Even if Congress has the power to enact freestanding 
legislation that “retaliates” against a judicial decision ex post,225 it might lack the 
power to “pretaliate” as a way to force the Court’s hand ex ante.226  
 
 220 See supra text accompanying notes 82–87; see also Dorf, supra note 81, at 327 (“Seen in this light, 
we can understand substitutive fallback law as a legislative effort to avoid the delegation issues that 
arise from a general background presumption of severability.”). 
 221 See generally Dorf, supra note 81, at 327–42 (discussing how the legislature can create laws to coerce 
the judiciary); Kameny, supra note 91, at 1001 (arguing that the legislature sometimes uses 
inseverability clauses for “an in terrorem function, as the legislature attempts to guard against judicial 
review altogether by making the price of invalidation too great.”). 
 222 Or consider the DOMA hypothetical posed in Dorf, supra note 81, at 333–36. 
 223 Id. at 327. 
 224 Kameny, supra note 91, at 1001–02 (“[F]or example, a contract entered into under duress is void; a 
will or other donative transfer executed under duress is void; an involuntary confession by a criminal 
defendant is inadmissible; and so on.”). 
 225 Dorf, supra note 81, at 332 (“There are also reasons of principle to think that perhaps Congress is 
entitled to retaliate against the courts for unpopular decisions. Although the Court’s modern 
jurisprudence tends to be self-protective, Stuart v. Laird and Ex parte McCardle have not been 
formally overruled . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 226 Id. at 335–36. Some argue that United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), and its progeny support 
Congress’s power to coerce the judiciary in this way. See, e.g., Keshav Poddar, How Democrats Can 
Keep Their Policies Safe From This Supreme Court, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2021, 5:45 AM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/democrats-supreme-court-progressive-policies-
protection.html (“Congress could . . . use[e] backup provisions unrelated to the main policy in a bill 
to coerce the [C]ourt into letting the legislation stand [because] . . . the [C]ourt has held that Congress 
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Assuming that a majority of the Justices are open to announcing a new 
separation of powers doctrine to this effect, the court reform package above 
could raise two questions. What would be the “test” for unconstitutional 
coercion, and would the particular layering found in the proposal above violate 
that test? 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) offers at 
least one data point for thinking through how the Court might operationalize 
 
can change underlying law relevant to a specific case . . . to explicitly dictate what the outcome of that 
case should be.”). This is questionable. 
  By most accounts, Klein prohibits Congress from conditioning the Court’s jurisdiction on a particular 
outcome on the merits, thereby ensuring that only one party can win on the merits. See Ryan, supra 
note 108, at 793 (explaining that the Court in Klein forbids Congress from granting jurisdiction 
conditionally to force the Court to reach a certain outcome); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 
897, 905 (2018) (plurality opinion) (“Congress violates Article III when it compel[s] . . . findings or 
results under old law, [in effect dictating that] [i]n Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” (first two alterations 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). If, however, Congress changes the 
law relevant to a specific pending case (including jurisdictional law), it can effectively achieve a similar 
result. See generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), and Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 
897. But this power does not neatly track the constitutional issues raised by backup law as a 
conceptual matter, nor are the boundaries of this power settled as a practical matter. 
  On the conceptual front, coercive backup laws and changes to the law underlying a pending case both 
reflect congressional attempts to achieve a particular result, but they use distinct methods and raise 
different concerns. For Klein, Congress wants a particular judgment in a pending case (or set of cases) 
and so Congress writes a law that unambiguously forces the desired result based on the expectation 
that the Court will faithfully interpret and apply the new law. For pretaliation, Congress wants a 
particular interpretation of the Constitution (across all cases, pending and future) and so Congress 
writes the backup law in a way expected to compromise the Court’s faithful interpretation of the 
primary law. One strikes at judicial independence over the decisional process, while the other strikes 
at judicial independence over the interpretive process. See G. Michael Parsons, Gerrymandering & 
Justiciability: The Political Question Doctrine After Rucho v. Common Cause, 95 IND. L.J. 1295, 
1323–45 (2020). To be sure, a principled basis exists for viewing the latter as more contestable terrain. 
See supra note 38. But the current Supreme Court seems likely to view both with a skeptical eye, and 
many scholars have proposed that the Court adopt a purpose-based reading of Klein that is more 
aggressive, not less. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 64, at 1074–83 (discussing the importance of 
considering Congress’s intent when interpreting statutes and arguing that the Court did this in Klein); 
Shugerman, supra note 51, at 985 (suggesting that Klein is about Congress’s motive).  
  On the practical front, the most recent case in the Klein line—Patchak v. Zinke—was a highly fractured 
case with no majority opinion. Only four Justices—Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan—stated 
Congress could remove jurisdiction over a pending case to ensure that case would be dismissed. 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor thought the suit should be dismissed on sovereign-immunity 
grounds, and Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch joined a dissent by Chief Justice Roberts who would 
have held the law to be an unlawful intrusion upon the judicial power. This does not bode well for 
any future attempts by Congress to explore the boundaries of decisional- or interpretive-forcing, 
especially with the addition of Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett. [Disclosure: I represented 
Respondent Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in Patchak v. Zinke.] 
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 In NFIB, the Supreme Court struck down 
part of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision.
228
 The 
provision required states to expand Medicaid coverage to cover all individuals 
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
line.
229
 If a state did not do so, it would lose all of its federal Medicaid funding, 




The NFIB Court held that this exceeded Congress’s powers under the 
Spending Clause of Article I, Section 8.
231
 Although Congress may “grant 
federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ 
‘taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take,’”
232
 the 
terms of that condition cannot cross the constitutional line from 
encouragement to coercion.
233
 Seven of the Justices held that the Medicaid 
expansion conditions crossed the line into unconstitutional coercion, but the 
rationales offered for this holding split across two opinions.
234
 
For our purposes, a deep dive into the specifics of each opinion is 
unnecessary. The composition of the Court has changed in significant ways 
since the decision, and the substantial differences between spending-coercion 
and judicial-coercion strains the analogical value of any detailed analysis. (One 
can question, for example, the premise that Congress possesses a predicate 
power to intentionally “encourage” a particular judicial decision, let alone 
“coerce” it.) 
For the sake of prediction, however, NFIB reflects the Court’s general 
willingness to articulate doctrines that protect the perceived prerogatives of 
 
227 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–85 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (applying a 
coercion standard to the Affordable Care Act).  
 228 See id. at 585 (severing part of the statute because “the Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw 
existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion”). 
 229 Id. at 576 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The Medicaid provisions of the Affordable Care Act, in contrast, require 
States to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with 
incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.”). 
 230 Id. at 579–80 (“Instead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that will not accept the new 
conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those States’ existing Medicaid funds.”). 
 231 Id. at 579–80; id. at 681–82 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 232 Id. at 576 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).  
 233 Id. at 579–80; id. at 681–82 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 234 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 
GEO. L.J. 861, 866–67 (2013) (outlining the opinions in NFIB). 
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constitutional actors, and the decision also reveals several factors that could 





 existence of coercion-in-fact,
237
 attaching new 
conditions to an existing status quo,
238




By almost all of these measures, the proposal above would seem to fare 
well. Each of its two policies—regularizing appointments and restoring 
jurisdiction—have common institutional aims addressing related troubling 
trends, and each layer pursues those ends with increasingly “settled” policy 
choices. No layer operates as a “punishment” unrelated to the prior layer, no 
layer attaches new conditions to an existing status quo, and no layer imposes 
any kind of drastic short-term change.
240
 
To be sure, the use of a contingent design (whatever the particular 
substance of its layers) is intended to level the institutional advantage of inertia 
that the Court might otherwise use to fight off reform, but that is not relevant 
to the question presented here: whether any of the specific backup policies 
proposed above might coerce the Court into choosing the primary policy in a 
way that threatens the Court’s decisional independence over the 
constitutionality of the primary policy. 
The only aspect of the package remotely open to a coercion objection 
could be the fact that the two policies are tied together within each layer: each 
layer stands or falls as one. Why would this create concern? Because Justices 
in the majority could view the “threat” to their agenda-setting power (reflected 
 
 235 See id. at 892 (noting that Roberts “employed an analysis that resembles, but is importantly distinct 
from, the germaneness doctrine”). 
 236 See id. at 871 (noting that the dissenters “looked principally to the size of the federal grant at issue”). 
 237 See id. at 870 (“For the Chief Justice, then, congressional motive to pressure the states is not enough 
to render a threatened funding cutoff unconstitutional; rather, the threat must actually take away the 
states’ ability, ‘not merely in theory but in fact,’ to choose whether to accept a funding condition.” 
(quoting NFIB, 567 U.S. at 581)). 
 238 See id at 872 (“And that is true whether the conditions are new strings attached to a preexisting federal 
program or are terms imposed for the first time in an entirely new program.”). 
 239 See id. 
 240 Consider a senior-status requirement backed by a provision that immediately changes the size of the 
Court to twenty-five members so that the current President can appoint all of the new members at 
once. The question is not whether such a plan is independently constitutional, but whether using 
such a plan as a backup provision to the senior-status requirement plan could be seen as coercing the 
Justices into ruling favorably on the senior-status requirement.  
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in layers two and three) as a way of influencing their decision on the merits of 
the senior-status policy found in layer one. 
The idea that this aspect of the legislation could be held “threatening” in a 
way that renders the entire bill constitutionally invalid seems implausible for 
many reasons. 
First, each layer’s approach to restoring jurisdiction is reasonably related 
to that layer’s approach to regularizing appointments. If the Supreme Court 
will remain at nine active Justices (as under Layer One), making only minor 
changes to the structure of the Court’s docket seems appropriate. If the 
Supreme Court seems likely to swell to, say, twenty or more Justices (as under 
Layer Three), shifting more heavily towards an error-correction role becomes 
more feasible. And the bigger the active appellate bench the more error-
correcting it can be, which explains the differences between Layer Two and 
Layer Three. 
Second, all the layers reduce the Court’s overall agenda-setting power to 
some extent. Thus, Layer One does not offer any kind of inappropriate 
“inducement” since none of the layers maintain the status quo. 
Third, it is worth considering who the change supposedly threatens, what 
power is supposedly threatened, and how that relates to the judicial role. The 
imposition of a supermajority (or unanimity) requirement to govern the power 
of case selection only reins in the power of particular blocs of Justices to decide 
what cases the Court should decide. Not only is this discretionary power a 
matter of legislative grace, but it also already stands in tension with the Justices’ 
own constitutional duties and is exercised in ways contrary to the implicit 
assurances provided to Congress when the power was granted. 
In advocating for the power to exercise this discretion, the Justices assured 
Congress that any petitions involving cases “of public importance or of wide 
general interest”—especially constitutional cases—would be granted in due 
course, and that the denial of petitions would mainly impact the “very large 




The Supreme Court as an institution is supposed to exercise its certiorari 
power in a nonpartisan and nonideological manner—or at least, to quote the 
Massachusetts Constitution, in a manner as impartial “as the lot of humanity 
 
 241 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1680, 1685 (citations omitted).  
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 Such a power simply is not threatened by a supermajority or 
unanimity requirement. No bloc of Justices within the Court is supposed to be 
exercising any kind of ideological agenda-setting power in the first place, so 
any suggestion that the “power” of such a bloc of Justices would be threatened 
amounts to a confession of bad faith by the Court more than a demonstration 
of bad faith by Congress.  
In short, the “tying” within each layer cannot act as a sword of Damocles 
without revealing the depth of the rot that the policies themselves are designed 
to address. Both liberal and conservative Justices alike pledge fidelity (to an 
almost comical degree) to the idea that they are mere “umpires”
243
 in the 
constitutional scheme, calling “balls and strikes”
244
 by impartially “applying the 
law to the facts at hand.”
245
 
While few legal scholars subscribe to such a simplistic assessment of 
judicial power (and one might reasonably question the sincerity of such 
statements), the universal invocation of these themes during confirmation 
hearings “suggests the existence of deep popular expectations about the 
distinction between law and politics.”
246
 And if Justices do not view themselves 
as “policy entrepreneurs, who seek to fulfill their policy goals through . . . their 
case selection policies”
247
 there is no basis for believing that a rule requiring 
unanimity to deny certiorari could be a “threat.” 
 
 242 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXIX. 
 243 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Nominee to be C.J. of the United States); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 111th Cong. 79 (2009) (statement of Hon. Sonia 
Sotomayor, Nominated to be an Associate J. of the Supreme Court of the United States); see also 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2018, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1538695822 (“[A] good judge 
must be an umpire—a neutral and impartial arbiter who favors no political party, litigant or policy.”). 
 244 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States, supra note 243, at 56. 
 245 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 243, at 79; see also The Nomination of Elena 
Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 111th Cong. 202–03 (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General 
of the United States) (emphasizing that judges do not do “anything other than apply[] the law.”). 
 246 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1256. 
 247 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1720 (citation omitted). 
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For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the Justices would hold that the 
layered design above unconstitutionally undermines their interpretive 
independence. 
All the same, enacting meaningful court reform is already an unpredictable 
endeavor and legislators may wish to minimize risk to the greatest extent 
possible. By uncoupling the two policies so that each stands alone, Congress 
could preempt even the minimal risk that the Court could hold the “tied” 
approach to layering coercive. 
CONCLUSION 
As I began writing the conclusion to this Article, an armed mob incited by 
President Trump broke into the U.S. Capitol, inflicting violence and 
destruction in an attempt to halt the counting of electoral college votes and the 
peaceful transition of power.
248
 As Members of Congress took shelter under 
their chairs, Capitol Police deployed tear gas in the rotunda and drew weapons 
at the chamber doors to protect the elected officials inside.
249
 During the 
insurrection that left five dead, authorities also discovered explosive devices 
hidden outside the nearby headquarters of the two major parties.
250
 
We are, hopefully, beyond the stage of denial where the implosion of 
democratic conventions can be written off as liberal handwringing. Norms at 
the federal (and state)
251
 level have been collapsing at an astonishing rate, and 
it is time to stop indulging the notion that this growing authoritarian strain in 
our politics will dissipate with accommodation. 
 
 248 See Lisa Mascaro, Eric Tucker, Mary Clare Jalonick & Andrew Taylor, Biden Win Confirmed After 
Pro-Trump Mob Storms US Capitol, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-confirmed-0409d7d753461377ff2c5bb91ac4050c.  
 249 Id. 
 250 See generally Rosa Sanchez, FBI Posts Photo of Person Who Placed Suspected Pipe Bombs Outside 
DNC, RNC, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2021, 7:31 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fbi-posts-photo-
person-suspected-pipe-bombs-dnc/story?id=75126041. 
 251 See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1224 
(2019) (noting the rise of so-called “power plays” that “bear a close family resemblance to the more 
familiar concept of what legal scholars have termed ‘constitutional hardball’: practices that flout widely 
agreed upon constitutional understandings without violating the law outright”); Levy, supra note 143, 
at 1122 (“[Court packing] has unquestionably happened in the past several years in state courts across 
the country. Specifically, in the last decade, there have been legislative attempts in at least ten states 
to alter the size of their courts of last resort, with two being ‘successful.’”). 
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In 2021, Democrats have a chance to rebuff (and, Republicans, a chance 
to repent for) the unpacking scheme that unsettled longstanding traditions 
governing Supreme Court appointments and to rebuild in their place a fairer 
and more durable system. Those committed to reestablishing and respecting 
democratic principles should put their words into action. 
A commitment to reforming the Supreme Court is only one part in that 
process, but no less important for it.
252
 As Professor Michael Seidman’s 
contribution to this Symposium on “Constitutional Law Outside the Courts” 
makes plain, the line between law and politics is often illusory,
253
 and the 
exercise of power by the Supreme Court cannot be independent or legitimate 
if it is unrepublican. 
And while Democrats should make a good-faith effort to create bipartisan 
buy-in from Republicans, the “proactive” insights above suggest that 
Democrats should not simply stand by and wait for the Biden Administration’s 
bipartisan court-reform commission to announce its findings.  
To start, the window of time available in a legislative session is a source of 
institutional power that Congress should not squander. Moreover, the task of 
identifying a “best” proposal is a trap. The only consensus that matters is the 
kind forged in actual legislative negotiations, and the presentation of a single 
proposal (rather than a layered proposal) could have the perverse effect of 
shrinking the space for potential agreement. Both Congress and the 
commission should be careful to avoid investing too much time and attention 
in a process that could ultimately undermine political action rather than 
encouraging it. 
Whatever system emerges, Congress could and should also apply it to the 
entire federal judiciary. The patterns and habits of strategic judicial retirements 
and partisan unpacking-through-obstruction extend well beyond the Supreme 
 
 252 Indeed, the opportunity to make inroads in the Judiciary was a meaningful source of the Republican 
establishment’s indulgence of the party’s Trumpian turn. See Elie Mystal, Donald Trump and the 
Plot to Take Over the Courts, NATION (July 15, 2019), 
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Court, and, in the latter case, the more routine stalling of lower-court judge 
confirmations arguably prepared the ground for the blockade of Judge 
Garland.
254
 An eighteen-year senior service requirement could extend to all 
judicial offices to prevent judicial manipulation, and new seats could be 
created automatically based on a predictable schedule and a formula tied to 
caseload per court to prevent legislative manipulation.
255
 
Any statutory change is, of course, subject to the risk that the opposing 
party will roll it back after the next election or whenever the opportunity arises. 
Nothing about the package above can guarantee bipartisan compliance over 
time. 
But then there’s nothing magical about the number nine either. Norms are 
durable only when they are shared. The layered approach—and plan—above 
proposes just one method to quickly assemble the largest possible coalition 
around a set of principled practices. Beyond that, it’s up to us to make 
deviations from the plan a new “third rail” of politics and to transform those 
practices into stable conventions. 
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